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Abstract
The relationship between Popper spaces (conditional probability spaces that sat-
isfy some regularity conditions), lexicographic probability systems (LPS’s) [Blume,
Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991a; Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991b], and
nonstandard probability spaces (NPS’s) is considered. If countable additivity is
assumed, Popper spaces and a subclass of LPS’s are equivalent; without the as-
sumption of countable additivity, the equivalence no longer holds. If the state space
is finite, LPS’s are equivalent to NPS’s. However, if the state space is infinite, NPS’s
are shown to be more general than LPS’s.
1 Introduction
Probability is certainly the most commonly-used approach for representing uncertainty
and conditioning the standard way of updating probabilities in the light of new informa-
tion. Unfortunately, there is a well-known problem with conditioning: Conditioning on
events of measure 0 is not defined. That makes it unclear how to proceed if an agent
∗The work was supported in part by NSF under grants IRI-96-25901, IIS-0090145, and CTC-0208535,
by ONR under grant N00014-02-1-0455, and by the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initia-
tive (MURI) program administered by the ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795. A preliminary version
appeared in the Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowl-
edge, 2001 [Halpern 2001]. This version includes detailed proofs and more discussion and more examples;
in addition, the material in Section 6 (on independence) is new.
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learns something to which she initially assigned probability 0. Although consideration of
events of measure 0 may seem to be of little practical interest, it turns out to play a critical
role in game theory, particularly in the analysis of strategic reasoning in extensive-form
games and in the analysis of weak dominance in normal-form games (see, for example,
[Battigalli 1996; Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002; Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991a;
Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991b; Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler 2008;
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Hammond 1994; Hammond 1999; Kohlberg and Reny 1997;
Kreps and Wilson 1982; Myerson 1986; Selten 1965; Selten 1975]). It also arises in the
analysis of conditional statements by philosophers (see [Adams 1966; McGee 1994]), and
in dealing with nonmonotonicity in Artificial Intelligence (see, for example, [Lehmann
and Magidor 1992]).
There have been various attempts to deal with the problem of conditioning on events
of measure 0. Perhaps the best known involves conditional probability spaces (CPS’s).
The idea, which goes back to Popper [1934, 1968] and de Finetti [1936], is to take as
primitive not probability, but conditional probability. If µ is a conditional probability
measure on a space W , then µ(V |U) may still be undefined for some pairs V and U , but
it is also possible that µ(V |U) is defined even if µ(U |W ) = 0. A second approach, which
goes back to at least Robinson [1973] and has been explored in the economics literature
[Hammond 1994; Hammond 1999], the AI literature [Lehmann and Magidor 1992; Wilson
1995], and the philosophy literature (see [McGee 1994] and the references therein) is to
consider nonstandard probability spaces (NPS’s), where there are infinitesimals that can
be used to model events that, intuitively, have infinitesimally small probability yet may
still be learned or observed.
There is a third approach to this problem, which uses sequences of probability mea-
sures to represent uncertainty. The most recent exemplar of this approach, which I focus
on here, are the lexicographic probability systems (LPS’s) of Blume, Brandenburger, and
Dekel [1991a, 1991b] (BBD from now on). However, the idea of using a system of mea-
sures to represent uncertainty actually was explored as far back as the 1950s by Re´nyi
[1956] (see Section 3.4). A lexicographic probability system is a sequence 〈µ0, µ1, . . .〉 of
probability measures. Intuitively, the first measure in the sequence, µ0, is the most im-
portant one, followed by µ1, µ2, and so on. One way to understand LPS’s is in terms
of NPS’s. Roughly speaking, the probability assigned to an event U by a sequence such
as 〈µ0, µ1〉 can be taken to be µ0(U) + ǫµ1(U), where ǫ is an infinitesimal. Thus, even if
the probability of U according to µ0 is 0, U still has a positive (although infinitesimal)
probability if µ1(U) > 0.
What is the precise relationship between these approaches? The relationship between
LPS’s and CPS’s has been considered before. For example, Hammond [1994] shows that
conditional probability spaces are equivalent to a subclass of LPS’s called lexicographic
conditional probability spaces (LCPS’s) if the state space is finite and it is possible to
condition on any nonempty set.1 As shown by Spohn [1986], Hammond’s result can
1Despite this isomorphism; it is not clear that conditional probability spaces are equivalent to LPS’s.
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be extended to arbitrary countably additive Popper spaces, where a Popper space is a
conditional probability space where the events on which conditioning is allowed satisfy
certain regularity conditions. As I show, this result is depends critically on a number
of assumptions. In particular, it does not work without the assumption of countable
additivity, it requires that we extend LCPS’s appropriately to the infinite case, and it is
sensitive to the choice of conditioning events. For example, if we consider CPS’s where
the conditioning events can be viewed as information sets, and so are are not closed under
supsersets (this is essentially the case considered by Battigalli and Sinischalchi [2002]),
then the result no longer holds.
Turning to the relationship between LPS’s and NPS’s, I show that if the state space
is finite, then LPS’s are in a sense equivalent to NPS’s. More precisely, say that two
measures of uncertainty ν1 and ν2 (each of which can be either an LPS or an NPS) are
equivalent, denoted ν1 ≈ ν2, if they cannot be distinguished by (real-valued) random
variables; that is, for all random variables X and Y , Eν1(X) ≤ Eν1(Y ) iff Eν2(X) ≤
Eν2(Y ) (where Eν(X) denotes the expected value of X with respect to ν). To the extent
that we are interested in these representations of uncertainty for decision making, then
we should not try to distinguish two representations that are equivalent. I show that, in
finite spaces, there is a straightforward bijection between ≈-equivalence classes of LPS’s
and NPS’s. This equivalence breaks down if the state space is infinite; in this case, NPS’s
are strictly more general than LPS’s (whether or not countable additivity is assumed).
Finally, I consider the relationship between Popper spaces and NPS’s, and show that
NPS’s are more general. (The theorem I prove is a generalization of one proved by McGee
[1994], but my interpretation of it is quite different; see Section 5.)
These results give some useful insight into independence of random variables. There
have been a number of alternative notions of independence considered in the literature of
extended probability spaces (i.e., approaches that deal with the problem of conditioning
on sets of measure 0): BBD considered three; Kohlberg and Reny [1997] considered two
others. It turns out that these notions are perhaps best understood in the context of
NPS’s; I describe and compare them here.
Many of the new results in this paper involve infinite spaces. Given that most games
studied by game theorists are finite, it is fair to ask whether these results have any sig-
nificance for game theory. I believe they do. Even if the underlying game is finite, the
set of types is infinite. Epistemic characterizations of solution concepts often make use of
complete type spaces, which include every possible type of every player, where a type de-
termines an (extended) probability over the strategies and types of the other players; this
must be an infinite space. For example, Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2002] use a complete
type space where the uncertainty is represented by cps’s to give an epistemic characteri-
zation of extensive-form rationalizability and backward induction, while Brandenburger,
It depends on exactly what we mean by equivalence. The same comment applies below where the word
“equivalent” is used. See Section 7 for further discussion. I thank Geir Asheim for bringing this point
to my attention.
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Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008] use a complete type space where the uncertainty is repre-
sented by LPS’s to get a characterization of weak dominance in normal-form games. As
the results of this paper show, the set of types depends to some extent on the notion of
extended probability used. Similarly, a number of characterizations of solution concepts
depend on independence (see, for example, [Battigalli 1996; Kohlberg and Reny 1997;
Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999]). Again, the results of this paper show that these notions
can be somewhat sensitive to exactly how uncertainty is represented, even with a finite
state space. While I do not present any new game-theoretic results here, I believe that
the characterizations I have provided may be useful both in terms of defending particular
choices of representation used and suggesting new solution concepts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review
all the relevant definitions for the three representations of uncertainty considered here.
Section 3 considers the relationship between Popper spaces and LPS’s. Section 4 considers
the relationship between LPS’s and NPS’s. Finally, Section 5 considers the relationship
between Popper spaces and NPS’s. In Section 6 I consider what these results have to say
about independence. I conclude with some discussion in Section 7.
2 Conditional, lexicographic, and nonstandard prob-
ability spaces
In this section I briefly review the three approaches to representing likelihood discussed
in the introduction.
2.1 Popper spaces
A conditional probability measure takes pairs U, V of subsets as arguments; µ(V, U) is
generally written µ(V |U) to stress the conditioning aspects. The first argument comes
from some algebra F of subsets of a space W ; if W is infinite, F is often taken to be a
σ-algebra. (Recall that an algebra of subsets of W is a set of subsets containing W and
closed under union and complementation. A σ-algebra is an algebra that is closed under
union countable.) The second argument comes from a set F ′ of conditioning events, that
is, that is, events on which conditioning is allowed. One natural choice is to take F ′ to
be F − ∅. But it may be reasonable to consider other restrictions on F ′. For example,
Battigalli and Sinischalchi [2002] take F ′ to consist of the information sets in a game,
since they are interested only in agents who update their beliefs conditional on getting
some information. The question is what constraints, if any, should be placed on F ′.
For most of this paper, I focus on Popper spaces (named after Karl Popper), defined
next, where the set F ′ satisfies four arguably reasonable requirements, but I occasionally
consider other requirements (see Section 3.3).
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Definition 2.1: A conditional probability space (cps) over (W,F) is a tuple (W,F ,F ′, µ)
such that F is an algebra over W , F ′ is a set of subsets of W (not necessarily an algebra
overW ) that does not contain ∅, and µ : F×F ′ → [0, 1] satisfies the following conditions:
CP1. µ(U |U) = 1 if U ∈ F ′.
CP2. µ(V1 ∪ V2 |U) = µ(V1 |U) + µ(V2 |U) if V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, U ∈ F ′, and V1, V2 ∈ F .
CP3. µ(V |U) = µ(V |X)× µ(X |U) if V ⊆ X ⊆ U , U,X ∈ F ′, V ∈ F .
Note that it follows from CP1 and CP2 that µ(· |U) is a probability measure on (W,F)
(and, in particular, that µ(∅ |U) = 0) for each U ∈ F ′. A Popper space over (W,F)
is a conditional probability space (W,F ,F ′, µ) that satisfies three additional conditions:
(a) F ′ ⊆ F , (b) F ′ is closed under supersets in F , in that if V ∈ F ′, V ⊆ V ′, and
V ′ ∈ F , then V ′ ∈ F ′, and (c) if U ∈ F ′ and µ(V |U) 6= 0 then V ∩ U ∈ F ′. If F is a
σ-algebra and µ is countably additive (that is, if µ(∪Vi |U) = ∑∞i=1 µ(Vi |U) if the Vi’s
are pairwise disjoint elements of F and U ∈ F ′), then the Popper space is said to be
countably additive. Let Pop(W,F) denote the set of Popper spaces over (W,F). If F is
a σ-algebra, I use a superscript c to denote the restriction to countably additive Popper
spaces, so Popc(W,F) denotes the set of countably additive Popper spaces over (W,F).
The probability measure µ in a Popper space is called a Popper measure.
The last regularity condition on F ′ required in a Popper space corresponds to the obser-
vation that for an unconditional probability measure µ, if µ(V |U) 6= 0 then µ(V ∩U) 6= 0,
so conditioning on V ∩U should be defined. Note that, since this regularity condition de-
pends on the Popper measure, it may well be the case that (W,F ,F ′, µ) and (W,F ,F ′, ν)
are both cps’s over (W,F), but only the former is a Popper space over (W,F).
Popper [1934, 1968] and de Finetti [1936] were the first to formally consider con-
ditional probability as the basic notion, although as Re´nyi [1964] points out, the idea
of taking conditional probability as primitive seems to go back as far as Keynes [1921].
CP1–3 are essentially due to Re´nyi [1955]. Van Fraassen [1976] defined what I have called
Popper measures; he called them Popper functions, reserving the name Popper measure
for what I am calling a countably additive Popper measure. Starting from the work of de
Finetti, there has been a general study of coherent conditional probabilities. A coherent
conditional probability is essentially a cps that is not necessarily a Popper space, since it
is defined on a set F ×F ′ where F ′ does not have to be a subset of F); see, for example,
[Coletti and Scozzafava 2002] and the references therein. Hammond [1994] discusses the
use of conditional probability spaces in philosophy and game theory, and provides an
extensive list of references.
2.2 Lexicographic probability spaces
Definition 2.2: A lexicographic probability space (LPS) (of length α) over (W,F) is a
tuple (W,F , ~µ) where, as before, W is a set of possible worlds and F is an algebra over
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W , and ~µ is a sequence of finitely additive probability measures on (W,F) indexed by
ordinals < α. (Technically, ~µ is a function from the ordinals less than α to probability
measures on (W,F).) I typically write ~µ as (µ0, µ1, . . .) or as (µβ : β < α). If F is a
σ-algebra and each of the probability measures in ~µ is countably additive, then ~µ is a
countably additive LPS. Let LPS (W,F) denote the set of LPS’s over (W,F). Again, if
F is a σ-algebra, a superscript c is used to denote countable additivity, so LPS c(W,F)
denote the set of countably additive LPS’s over (W,F). When (W,F) are understood, I
often refer to ~µ as the LPS. I write ~µ(U) > 0 if µβ(U) > 0 for some β.
There is a sense in which LPS (W,F) can capture a richer set of preferences than
Pop(W,F), even if we restrict to finite spaces W (so that countable additivity is not
an issue). For example, suppose that W = {w1, w2}, µ0(w1) = µ0(w2) = 1/2, and
µ1(w1) = 1. The LPS ~µ = (µ0, µ1) can be thought of describing the situation where w1
is very slightly more likely than w2. Thus, for example, if Xi is a bet that pays off 1 in
state wi and 0 in state w3−i, then according to ~µ, X1 should be (slightly) prefereed to
X2, but for all r > 1, rX2 is preferred to X1. There is no CPS on {w1, w2} that leads to
these preferences
Note that, in this example, the support of µ2 is a subset of that of µ1. To obtain a
bijection between LPS’s and CPS’s, we cannot allow much overlap between the supports
of the measures that make an LPS. What counts as “much overlap” turns out to be a
somewhat subtle. One way to formalize it was proposed by BBD. They defined a lexico-
graphic conditional probability space (LCPS) to be an LPS such that, roughly speaking,
the probability measures in the sequence have disjoint supports; more precisely, there
exist sets Uβ ∈ F such that µβ(Uβ) = 1 and the sets Uβ are pairwise disjoint for β < α.
One motivation for considering disjoint sets is to consider an agent who has a sequence
of hypotheses (h0, h1, . . .) regarding how the world works. If the primary hyothesis h0
is discarded, then the agent judges events according to h1; if h1 is discarded, then the
agent uses h2, and so on. Associated with hypothesis hβ is the probability measure µβ.
What would cause hβ to be discarded is observing an event U such that µβ(U) = 0. The
set Uβ is the support of the hypothesis hβ. In some cases, it seems reasonable to think
of the supports of these hypotheses as disjoint. This leads to LCPS’s.
BBD considered only finite spaces. When we move to infinite spaces, requiring dis-
jointness of the supports of hypotheses may be too strong. Brandenburger, Friedenberg,
and Keisler [2008] consider finite-length LPS’s ~µ that satisfy the property that there exist
sets Uβ (not necessarily disjoint) such that µβ(Uβ) = 1 and µβ(Uγ) = 0 for γ 6= β. Call
such an LPS an MSLPS (for mutually singular LPS ). Let a structured LPS (SLPS) be an
LPS ~µ such that there exist sets Uβ ∈ F such that µβ(Uβ) = 1 and µβ(Uγ) = 0 for γ > β.
Thus, in an SLPS, later hypotheses are given probability 0 according to the probabil-
ity measure induced by earlier hypotheses, but earlier hypotheses do not necessarily get
probability 0 according the later hypotheses. (Spohn [1986] also considered SLPS’s; he
called them dimensionally well-ordered families of probability measures.) Clearly every
LCPS is an MSLPS, and every MSLPS is an SLPS. If α is countable and we require
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countable additivity (or if α is finite) then the notions are easily seen to coincide. Given
an SLPS ~µ with associated sets Uβ , β < α, define U
′
β = Uβ − (∪γ>βUγ). The sets U ′β are
clearly pairwise disjoint elements of F , and µβ(U ′β) = 1. However, in general, LCPS’s are
a strict subset of MSLPS’s, and MSLPS’s are a strict subsets of SLPS’s, as the following
two examples show.
Example 2.3: Consider a well-ordering of the interval [0, 1], that is, a bijection from
[0, 1] to an initial segment of the ordinals. Suppose that this initial segment of the
ordinals has length α. Let ([0, 1],F , ~µ) be an LPS of length α where F consists of the
Borel subsets of [0, 1]. Let µ0 be the standard Borel measure on [0, 1], and let µβ be the
measure that gives probability 1 to rβ, the βth real in the well-ordering. This clearly
gives an SLPS, since we can take U0 = [0, 1] and Uβ = {rβ} for 0 < β < α; note that
µα(Uβ) = 0 for β > α. However, this SLPS is not equivalent to any MSLPS (and hence
not to any LCPS); there is no set U ′0 such that µ0(U
′
0) = 1 and U
′
0 is disjoint from rβ for
all β with 0 < β < α.
Example 2.4: Suppose that W = [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Again, consider a well-ordering on [0, 1].
Using the notation of Example 2.3, define U0,β = rβ×[0, 1] and U1,β = [0, 1]×{rβ}. Define
µi,β to be the Borel measure on Ui,β. Consider the LPS (µ0,0, µ0,1, . . . , µ1,0, µ1,1, . . .).
Clearly this is an MSLPS, but not an LCPS.
The difference between LCPS’s, MSLPS’s, and SLPS’s does not arise in the work
of BBD, since they consider only finite sequences of measures. The restriction to finite
sequences, in turn, is due to their restriction to finite sets W of possible worlds. Clearly,
if W is finite, then all LCPS’s over W must have length ≤ |W |, since the measures in an
LCPS have disjoint supports. Here it will play a more significant role.
We can put an obvious lexicographic order <L on sequences (x0, x1, . . .) of numbers
in [0, 1] of length α: (x0, x1, . . .) <L (y0, y1, . . .) if there exists β < α such that xβ < yβ
and xγ = yγ for all γ < β. That is, we compare two sequences by comparing their
components at the first place they differ. (Even if α is infinite, because we are dealing
with ordinals, there will be a least ordinal at which the sequences differ if they differ at
all.) This lexicographic order will be used to define decision rules.
BBD define conditioning in LPS’s as follows. Given ~µ and U ∈ F such that ~µ(U) > 0,
let ~µ|U = (µk0(· |U), µk1(· |U), . . .), where (k0, k1, . . .) is the subsequence of all indices for
which the probability of U is positive. Formally, k0 = min{k : µk(U) > 0} and for an
arbitrary ordinal β > 0, if µkγ has been defined for all γ < β and there exists a measure
µδ in ~µ such that µδ(U) > 0 and δ > kγ for all γ < β, then kβ = min{δ : µδ(U) > 0, δ >
kγ for all γ < β}. Note that ~µ|U is undefined if ~µ(U) = 0.
2.3 Nonstandard probability spaces
It is well known that there exist non-Archimedean fields—fields that include the real
numbers as a subfield but also have infinitesimals , numbers that are positive but still
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less than any positive real number. The smallest such non-Archimedean field, commonly
denoted IR(ǫ), is the smallest field generated by adding to the reals a single infinitesimal
ǫ.2 We can further restrict to non-Archimedean fields that are elementary extensions
of the standard reals: they agree with the standard reals on all properties that can be
expressed in a first-order language with a predicate N representing the natural numbers.
For most of this paper, I use only the following properties of non-Archimedean fields:
1. If IR∗ is a non-Archimedean field, then for all b ∈ IR∗ such that −r < b < r for
some standard real r > 0, there is a unique closest real number a such that |a−b| is
an infinitesimal. (Formally, a is the inf of the set of real numbers that are at least
as large as b.) Let st (b) denote the closest standard real to b; st (b) is sometimes
read “the standard part of b”.
2. If st (ǫ/ǫ′) = 0, then aǫ < ǫ′ for all positive standard real numbers a. (If aǫ were
greater than ǫ′, then ǫ/ǫ′ would be greater than 1/a, contradicting the assumption
that st (ǫ/ǫ′) = 0.)
Given a non-Archimedean field IR∗, a nonstandard probability space (NPS) over (W,F)
(with range IR∗) is a tuple (W,F , µ), where W is a set of possible worlds, F is an alge-
bra of subsets of W , and µ assigns to sets in F a nonnegative element of IR∗ such that
µ(W ) = 1 and µ(U ∪ V ) = µ(U) + µ(V ) if U and V are disjoint.3
If W is infinite, we may also require that F be a σ-algebra and that µ be countably
additive. (There are some subtleties involved with countable additivity in nonstandard
probability spaces; see Section 4.3.)
3 Relating Popper Spaces to (S)LPS’s
In this section, I consider a mapping FS→P from SLPS’s over (W,F) to Popper spaces
over (W,F), for each fixed W and F , and show that, in many cases of interest, FS→P
is a bijection. Given an SLPS (W,F , ~µ) of length α, consider the cps (W,F ,F ′, µ) such
that F ′ = ∪β<α{V ∈ F : µβ(V ) > 0}. For V ∈ F ′, let βV be the smallest index
such µβV (V ) > 0. Define µ(U | V ) = µβV (U | V ). I leave it to the reader to check that
(W,F ,F ′, µ) is a Popper space.
There are many bijections between two spaces. Why is FS→P of interest? Suppose
that FS→P (W,F , ~µ) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). It is easy to check that the following two important
properties hold:
1. F ′ consists precisely of those events for which conditioning in the LPS is defined;
that is, F ′ = {U : ~µ(U) > 0}.
2The construction of IR(ǫ) apparently goes back to Robinson [1973]. It is reviewed by Hammond
[1994, 1999] and Wilson [1995] (who calls IR(ǫ) the extended reals).
3Note that, unlike Hammond [1994, 1999], I do not restrict the range of probability measures to
consist of ratios of polynomials in ǫ with nonnegative coefficients.
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2. For U ∈ F ′, µ(· |U) = µ′(· |U), where µ′ is the first probability measure in the
sequence ~µ|U . That is, the Popper measure agrees with the most significant prob-
ability measure in the conditional LPS given U . Given that an LPS assigns to an
event U a sequence of numbers and a Popper measure assigns to U just a single
number, this is clearly the best single number to take.
It is clear that these two properties in fact characterize FS→P . Thus, FS→P preserves the
events on which conditioning is possible and the most significant term in the lexicographic
probability.
3.1 The finite case
It is useful to separate the analysis of FS→P into two cases, depending on whether or not
the state space is finite. I consider the finite case first.
BBD claim without proof that FS→P is a bijection from LCPS’s to conditional prob-
ability spaces. They work in finite spaces W (so that LCPS’s are equivalent to SLPS’s)
and restrict attention to LPS’s where F = 2W and F ′ = 2W − {∅} (so that conditioning
is defined for all nonempty sets). Since F ′ = 2W − {∅}, the cps’s they consider are all
Popper spaces. Hammond [1994] provides a careful proof of this result, under the restric-
tions considered by BBD. I generalize Hammond’s result by considering finite Popper
spaces with arbitrary conditioning events. No new conceptual issues arise in doing this
extension; I include it here only to be able to contrast it with the other results.
Let SLPS (W,F) denote the set of LPS’s over (W,F); let SLPS (W,F ,F ′) denote the
set of LPS’s (W,F , ~µ) such that ~µ(U) > 0 for all U ∈ F ′ (i.e., µβ(U) > 0 for some β); as
usual, I use a superscript c to denote countable additivity, so, for example, SLPS c(W,F)
denotes the set of countably additive SLPS’s over (W,F). Let Pop(W,F ,F ′) denote the
set of Popper spaces of the form (W,F ,F ′) and let Popc(W,F ,F ′) denote the set of
Popper spaces of the form (W,F ,F ′, µ) where µ is countably additive.
Theorem 3.1: IfW is finite, then FS→P is a bijection from SLPS(W,F ,F ′) to Pop(W,F ,F ′).
Proof: It is immediate from the definition that if (W,F , ~µ) ∈ SLPS (W,F ,F ′), then
FS→P (W,F , ~µ) ∈ Pop(W,F ,F ′). It is also straightforward to show that FS→P is an
injection (see the appendix for details). The work comes in showing that FS→P is a
surjection (or, equivalently, in constructing an inverse to FS→P ). I sketch the main ideas
of the argument here, leaving details to the appendix.
Given µ ∈ Pop(W,F ,F ′), the idea is to choose k ≤ |W | and k disjoint sets U0, . . . , Uk ∈
F ′ appropriately such that µj = µ |Uj for j = 0, . . . , k (i.e., µj(V ) = µ(V |Uj)) amd
FS→P (W,F , ~µ) = µ. Since the sets U0, . . . , Uk are disjoint, ~µ must be an SLPS. The
difficulty lies in choosing U0, . . . , Uk so that ~µ(U) > 0 iff U ∈ F ′. This is done as follows.
Let U0 be the smallest set U ∈ F such that µ(U) = 1. Since W is finite, there is such
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a smallest set; it is simply the intersection of all sets U such that µ(U |W ) = 1. Since
µ(U0 |W ) > 0, it follows that U0 ∈ F ′. If U 0 /∈ F ′. then (because F ′ is closed under
supersets in F), no subset of U 0 is in F ′. If U 0 ∈ F ′, let U1 be the smallest set in F such
that µ(U1 |U0) = 1. Note that U1 ⊆ U0 and that U1 ∈ F ′. Continuing in this way, it is
clear that there exists a k ≥ 0 and a sequence of pairwise disjoint sets U0, U1, . . . , Uk such
that (1) Ui ∈ F ′ for i = 0, . . . , k, (2) for i < k, U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Ui ∈ F ′ and Ui+1 is the smallest
subset of F such that µ(Ui+1 |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Ui) = 1, and (3) U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uk /∈ F ′. Condition
(2) guarantees that Ui+1 is a subset of U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Ui, so the Ui’s are pairwise disjoint.
Define the LPS ~µ = (µ1, . . . , µk) by taking µi(V ) = µ(V |Ui). Clearly the support of µi
is Ui, so this is an LCPS (and hence an SLPS).
Corollary 3.2: If W is finite, then FS→P is a bijection from SLPS(W,F) to Pop(W,F).
3.2 The infinite case
The case where the state spaceW is infinite is not considered by either BBD or Hammond.
It presents some interesting subtleties.
It is easy to see that FS→P is an injection from SLPS’s to Popper spaces. However,
as the following two examples show, if we do not require countable additivity, then it is
not a bijection.
Example 3.3: (This example is essentially due to Robert Stalnaker [private commu-
nication, 2000].) Let W = IN , the natural numbers, let F consist of the finite and
cofinite subsets of IN (recall that a cofinite set is the complement of a finite set), and
let F ′ = F − {∅}. If U is cofinite, take µ1(V |U) to be 1 if V is cofinite and 0 if V is
finite. If U is finite, define µ1(V |U) = |V ∩ U |/|U |. I leave it to the reader to check
that (IN,F ,F ′, µ1) is a Popper space. Note that µ1 is not countably additive (since
µ1({i} | IN) = 0 for all i, although µ1(IN | IN) = 1). Suppose that there were some LPS
(IN,F , ~µ) which was mapped by FS→P to this Popper space. Then it is easy to check that
if µi is the first measure in ~µ such that µi(U) > 0 for some finite set U , then µi(U
′) > 0
for all nonempty finite sets U ′. To see this, note that for any nonempty finite set U ′,
since µi(U) > 0, it follows that µi(U ∪ U ′) > 0. Since U ∪ U ′ is finite, it must be the
case that µi is the first measure in ~µ such that µi(U ∪ U ′) > 0. Thus, by definition,
µ1(U ′ |U ∪ U ′) = µi(U ′ |U ∪ U ′). Since µ1(U ′ |U ∪ U ′) > 0, it follows that µi(U ′) > 0.
Thus, µi(U
′) > 0 for all nonempty finite sets U ′.
It is also easy to see that µi(U) must be proportional to |U | for all finite sets U .
To show this, it clearly suffices to show that µi(n) = µi(0) for all n ∈ IN . But this is
immediate from the observation that
µi({0} | {0, n}) = µ1({0} | {0, n}) = |{0}|/|{0, n}| = 1
2
.
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But there is no probability measure µi on the natural numbers such that µi(n) = µi(0) > 0
for all n ≥ 0. For if µi(0) > 1/N , then µi({0, . . . , N − 1}) > 1, a contradiction. (See
Example 4.8 for further discussion of this setup.)
Example 3.4: Again, let W = IN , let F consist of the finite and cofinite subsets of IN ,
and let F ′ = F−{∅}. As with µ1, if U is cofinite, take µ2(V |U) to be 1 if V is cofinite and
0 if V is finite. However, now, if U is finite, define µ2(V |U) = 1 if max(V ∩U) = maxU ,
and µ2(V |U) = 0 otherwise. Intuitively, if n > n′, then n is infinitely more probable
than n′ according to µ2. Again, I leave it to the reader to check that (IN,F ,F ′, µ2) is a
Popper space. Suppose there were some LPS (IN,F , ~µ) which was mapped by FS→P to
this Popper space. Then it is easy to check that if µn is the first measure in ~µ such that
µn({n}) > 0, then µn comes before µn′ in ~µ if n > n′. However, since ~µ is well-founded,
this is impossible.
As the following theorem, originally proved by Spohn [1986], shows, there are no
such counterexamples if we restrict to countably additive SLPS’s and countably additive
Popper spaces.
Theorem 3.5: [Spohn 1986] For allW , the map FS→P is a bijection from SLPS
c(W,F ,F ′)
to Popc(W,F ,F ′).
Proof: Again, the difficulty comes in showing that FS→P is onto. Given a Popper space
(W,F ,F ′, µ), I again construct sets U0, U1, . . . and an LPS ~µ such that µβ(V ) = µ(V |Uβ),
and show that FS→P (W,F , ~µ) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). However, now a completely different
construction is required; the earlier inductive construction of the sequence U0, . . . , Uk no
longer works. The problem already arises in the construction of U0. There may no longer
be a smallest set U0 such that µ(U0) = 1. Consider, for example, the interval [0, 1] with
Borel measure. There is clearly no smallest subset U of [0, 1] such that µ(U) = 1. The
details can be found in the appendix.
Corollary 3.6: For allW , the map FS→P is a bijection from SLPS
c(W,F) to Popc(W,F).
It is important in Corollary 3.6 that we consider SLPS’s and not MSLPS’s or LCPS’s.
FS→P is in fact not a bijection from MSLPS’s or LCPS’s to Popper spaces.
Example 3.7: Consider the Popper space ([0, 1],F ,F ′, µ) which is the image under
FS→P of the SLPS constructed in Example 2.3. It is easy to see that this Popper space
cannot be the image under FS→P of some MSPLS (and hence not of some LCPS either).
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3.3 Treelike CPS’s
One of the requirements in a Popper space is that F ′ be closed under supersets in F .
If we think of F ′ as consisting of all sets on which conditioning is possible, this makes
sense; if we can condition on a set U , we should be able to consider on a superset V of
U . But if we think of F ′ as representing all the possible evidence that can be obtained
(and thus, the set of events on which an agent must be be able to condition, so as to
update her beliefs), there is no reason that F ′ should be closed under supersets; nor, for
that matter, is it necessarily the case that if U ∈ F ′ and µ(V |U) 6= 0, then V ∩U ∈ F ′.
In general, a cps where F ′ does not have these properties cannot be represented by an
LPS, as the following example shows.
Example 3.8: Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, let F consist of all subsets of W , and let F ′
consist of all the 2-element subsets ofW . Clearly F ′ is not closed under supersets. Define
µ on F ×F ′ such that µ(w1 | {w1, w3}) = µ(w4 | {w2, w4}) = 1/3, and µ(w1 | {w1, w2}) =
µ(w4 | {w3, w4}) = 1/2, and CP1 and CP2 hold. This is easily seen to determine µ.
Moreover, µ vaciously satisfies CP3, since there do not exist distinct sets U and X in F ′
such that U ⊆ X . It is easy to show that there is no unconditional probability µ∗ on W
such that µ∗(U | V ) = µ(U | V ) for all pairs (U, V ) ∈ F ×F ′ such that µ∗(V ) > 0 (where,
for µ∗, the conditional probability is defined in the standard way).4 It easily follows that
there is no LPS ~µ such that ~µ(U | V ) = µ(U | V ) for all (U, V ) ∈ F ×F ′ (since otherwise
µ0 would agree with µ on all pairs (U, V ) ∈ F × F ′ such that µ(V ) > 0). Had F ′ been
closed under supersets, it would have included W . It is easy to see that it is impossible
to extend µ to F × (F ′ ∪ {W}) so that CP3 holds.
In the game-theory literature, Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2002] use conditional proba-
bility measures to model players’ beliefs about other players’ strategies in extensive-form
games where agents have perfect recall. The conditioning events are essentially informa-
tion sets; which can be thought of as representing the possible evidence that an agent can
obtain in a agame. Thus, the cps’s they consider are not necessarily Popper spaces, for
the reasons described above. Nevertheless, the conditioning events considered by Batti-
galli and Sinischalchi satisfy certain properties that prevent an analogue of Example 3.8
from holding. I now make this precise.
Formally, I assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets in
F ′ and the information sets of some fixed player i. For each set U ∈ F ′, there is a
unique information set IU for player i such that U consists of all the strategy profiles
that reach IU . With this identification, it is immediate that we can organize the sets
in F ′ into a forest (i.e., a collection of trees), with the same “reachability” structure as
that of the information sets in the game tree. The topmost sets in the forest are the
ones corresponding to the topmost information sets for player i in the game tree. There
4This example is closely related to examples of conditional probabilities for which there is no common
prior; see, for example, [Halpern 2002, Example 2.2].
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may be several such topmost information sets if nature or some player j other than i
makes the first move in the game. (That is why we have a forest, rather than a tree.)
The immediate successors of a set U are the sets of strategy profiles corresponding to
information sets for player i reached immediately after IU . Because agents have perfect
recall, the conditioning events F ′ have the following properties:
T1. F ′ is countable.
T2. The elements of F ′ can be organized as a forest (i.e., a collection of trees) where,
for each U ∈ F ′, if there is an edge from U to some U ′ ∈ F ′, then U ′ ⊆ U , all
the immediate successors of U are disjoint, and U is the union of its immediate
successors.
T3. The topmost nodes in each tree of the forest form a partition of W .
Say that a set F ′ is treelike if it satisfies T1–3. It follows from T2 and T3 that, for any
sets U and U ′ in a treelike set F ′, either U ⊆ U ′ (if U is a descendant of U ′ in some tree),
U ′ ⊆ U (if U ′ is a descendant of U), or U and U ′ are disjoint (if neither is a descendant
of the other). If F ′ is treelike, let T c(W,F ,F ′) consist of all countably additive cps’s
defined on F ×F ′. I abuse notation in the next result, viewing FS→P as a mapping from
SLPS c(W,F ,F ′) to T c(W,F ,F ′).
Proposition 3.9: The map FS→P is a surjection from SLPS
c(W,F ,F ′) onto T c(W,F ,F ′).
Since F ′ is countable, every SLPS in SLPS c(W,F ,F ′) must have at most countable
length. Thus, there is no distinction between SLPS’s, LCPS’s, and MSPLS’s in this
case. (Indeed, in the proof of Proposition 3.9, the LPS constructed to demonstrate the
surjection is an LCPS.) Note that we cannot hope to get a bijection here, even if W is
finite. For example, suppose that W = {w1, w2}, F = 2W , and F ′ = {{w1}, {w2}}. F ′
is clearly treelike, and there is a unique cps µ on (W,F ,F ′). FS→P maps every SLPS in
SLPS (W,F , F ′) to µ, but is clearly not a bijection. (This example also shows that we
do not get a bijection by considering MSLPS’s or LCPS’s either.)
3.4 Related Work
It is interesting to contrast these results to those of Re´nyi [1956] and van Fraassen [1976].
Re´nyi considers what he calls dimensionally ordered systems. A dimensionally ordered
system over (W,F) has the form (W,F ,F ′, {µi : i ∈ I}), where F is an algebra of subsets
of W , F ′ is a subset of F closed under finite unions (but not necessarily closed under
supersets in F), I is a totally ordered set (but not necessarily well-founded, so it may
not, for example, have a first element) and µi is a measure on (W,F) (not necessarily a
probability measure) such that
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• for each U ∈ F ′, there is some i ∈ I such that 0 < µi(U) < ∞ (note that the
measure of a set may, in general, be ∞),
• if µi(U) <∞ and j < i, then µj(U) = 0.
Note that it follows from these conditions that for each U ∈ F ′, there is exactly one i ∈ I
such that 0 < µi(U) <∞.
There is an obvious analogue of the map FS→P mapping dimensionally ordered sys-
tems to cps’s. Namely, let FD→C map the dimensionally ordered system (W,F ,F ′, {µi :
i ∈ I}) to the cps (W,F ,F ′, µ), where µ(V |U) = µi(V |U), where i is the unique element
of I such that 0 < µi(U) < ∞. Re´nyi shows that FD→C is a bijection from dimension-
ally ordered systems to cps’s where the set F ′ is closed under finite unions. (Csa´sza´r
[1955] extends this result to cases where the set F ′ is not necessarily closed under finite
unions.) Re´nyi assumes that all measures involved are countably additive and that F
is a σ-algebra, but these are inessential assumptions. That is, his proof goes through
without change if F is an algebra and the measures are additive; all that happens is that
the resulting conditional probability measure is additive rather than σ-additive.
It is critical in Re´nyi’s framework that the µi’s are arbitrary measures, and not just
probability measures. His result does not hold if the µi’s are required to be probability
measures. In the case of finitely additive measures, the Popper space constructed in
Example 3.3 already shows why. It corresponds to a dimensionally ordered space (µ1, µ2)
where µ1(U) is 1 if U is cofinite and 0 if U is finite and µ2(U) = |U | (i.e., the measure of
a set is its cardinality). It cannot be captured by a dimensionally ordered space where
all the elements are probability measures, for the same reason that it is not the image
of an SLPS under FS→P . (Re´nyi [1956] actually provides a general characterization of
when the µi’s can be taken to be (countably additive) probability measures.) Another
example is provided by the Popper space considered in Example 3.4. This corresponds
to the dimensionally ordered system {µβ : β ∈ IN ∪ {∞}}, where
µn(U) =


0 if max(U) < n
1 if max(U) = n
∞ if max(U) > n,
where max(U) is taken to be ∞ if U is cofinite.
Krauss [1968] restricts to Popper algebras of the form F × (F −{∅}); this allows him
to simplify and generalize Re´nyi’s analysis. Interestingly, he also proves a representation
theorem in the spirit of Re´nyi’s that involves nonstandard probability.
Van Fraassen [1976] proves a result whose assumptions are somewhat closer to The-
orem 3.5. Van Fraassen considers what he calls ordinal families of probability measures.
An ordinal family over (W,F) is a sequence of the form {(Wβ,Fβ, µβ) : β < α} such that
• ∪β<αWβ =W ;
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• Fβ is an algebra over Wβ;
• µβ is a probability measure with domain Fβ;
• ∪β<αFβ = F ;
• if U ∈ F and V ∈ Fβ, then U ∩ V ∈ Fβ;
• if U ∈ F , U ∩ V ∈ Fβ, and µβ(U ∩ V ) > 0, then there exists γ such that U ∈ Fγ
and µγ(U) > 0.
Given an ordinal family {(Wβ,Fβ, µβ) : β < α} over (W,F), consider the map
FO→C which associates with it the cps (W,F ,F ′, µ), where F ′ = {U ∈ F : µγ(U) >
0 for some γ < α} and µ(V |U) = µβ(V |U), where β is the smallest ordinal such that
U ∈ Fβ and µβ(U) > 0. Van Fraassen shows that FO→C is a bijection from ordinal
families over (W,F) to Popper spaces over (W,F). Again, for van Fraassen, countable
additivity does not play a significant role. If F is a σ-algebra, a countably additive or-
dinal family over (W,F) is defined just as an ordinal family, except that now Fβ is a
σ-algebra over Wβ for all β < α, µα is a countably additive probability measure, and F is
the least σ-algebra containing ∪β<αFβ (since ∪β<αFβ is not in general a σ-algebra). The
same map FO→C is also a bijection from countably additive ordinal families to countably
additive Popper spaces.
Spohn’s result, Theorem 3.5, can be viewed as a strengthening of van Fraassen’s
result in the countably additive case, since for Theorem 3.5 all the Fβ’s are required to
be identical. This is a nontrivial requirement. The fact that it cannot be met in the case
that W is infinite and the measures are not countably additive is an indication of this.
It is worth seeing how van Fraassen’s approach handles the finitely additive examples
which do not correspond to SLPS’s. The Popper space in Example 3.3 corresponds
to the ordinal family {(Wn,Fn, µn) : n ≤ ω} where, for n < ω, Wn = {1, . . . , n},
Fn consists of all subsets of Wn, and µn is the uniform measure, while Wω = IN , Fω
consists of the finite and cofinite subsets of IN , and µω(U) is 1 if U is cofinite and 0 if
U is finite. It is easy to check that this ordinal family has the desired properties. The
Popper space in Example 3.4 is represented in a similar way, using the ordinal family
{(Wn,Fn, µ′n) : n ≤ ω}, where µ′n(U) is 1 if n ∈ U and 0 otherwise, while µ′ω = µω. I
leave it to the reader to see that this family has the desired properties. The key point
to observe here is the leverage obtained by allowing each probability measure to have a
different domain.
4 Relating LPS’s to NPS’s
In this section, I show that LPS’s and NPS’s are isomorphic in a strong sense. Again, I
separate the results for the finite case and the infinite case.
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4.1 The finite case
Consider an LPS of the form (µ1, µ2, µ3). Roughly speaking, the corresponding NPS
should be (1 − ǫ − ǫ2)µ1 + ǫµ2 + ǫ2µ3, where ǫ is some infinitesimal. That means that
µ2 gets infinitesimal weight relative to µ1 and µ3 gets infinitesimal weight relative to µ2.
But which infinitesimal ǫ should be chosen? Intuitively, it shouldn’t matter. No matter
which infinitesimal is chosen, the resulting NPS should be equivalent to the original LPS.
I now make this intuition precise.
Suppose that we want to use an LPS or an NPS to compute which of two bounded,
real-valued random variables has higher expected value.The intended application here is
decision making, where the random variables can be thought of as the utilities corre-
sponding to two actions; the one with higher expected utility is preferred. The idea is
that two measures of uncertainty (each of which can be an LPS or an NPS) are equivalent
if the preference order they place on (real valued) random variables (according to their
expected value) is the same. I consider only random variables with countable range. This
restriction both makes the exposition simpler and avoids having to define, for example,
integration with respect to an NPS. Note that, given an LPS ~µ, the expected value of
a random variable X is
∑
x x~µ(X = x), where ~µ(X = x) is a sequence of probability
values and the multiplication and addition are pointwise. Thus, the expected value is a
sequence; these sequences can be compared using the lexicographic order <L defined in
Section 2.2. If ν is either an LPS or NPS, then let Eν(X) denote the expected value of
random variable X according to ν.
Definition 4.1: If each of ν1 and ν2 is either an NPS over (W,F) or an LPS over (W,F),
then ν1 is equivalent to ν2, denoted ν1 ≈ ν2, if, for all real-valued random variables X
and Y measurable with respect to F , Eν1(X) ≤ Eν1(Y ) iff Eν2(X) ≤ Eν2(Y ). (If X
has countable range, which is the only case I consider here, then X is measurable with
respect to F iff {w : X(w) = x} ∈ F for all x in the range of X .)5
This notion of equivalence satisfies analogues of the two key properties of the map
FS→P considered at the beginning of Section 3.
Proposition 4.2: If ν ∈ NPS(W,F), ~µ ∈ LPS(W,F), and ν ≈ ~µ, then ν(U) > 0 iff
~µ(U) > ~0 Moreover, if ν(U) > 0, then st (ν(V |U)) = µj(V |U), where µj is the first
probability measure in ~µ such that µj(U) > 0.
5As pointed out by Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel, this notion of equivalence is essentially
the same as one implicitly used by BBD. They work with preference orders on Anscombe-Aumann acts
[Anscombe and Aumann 1963], that is, functions from states to probability measures on prizes. Fix a
utility function u on prizes. Then take ν1 ∼u ν2 if the preference order on acts generated by ν1 and
u is the same as that generated by ν2 and u. It is not hard to show that this notion of equivalence is
independent of the choice of utility function; if u and u′ are two utility functions on prizes, then ν1 ∼u ν2
iff ν1 ∼u′ ν2. Moreover, ν1 ∼u ν2 iff ν1 ≈ ν2. The advantage of the notion of equivalence used here is
that it is defined without the overhead of preference orders on acts.
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As the next result shows, for SLPS’s, the ≈-equivalence classes are singletons, even
if the set of worlds is infinite. (This is not true for LPS’s in general. For example,
(µ, µ) ≈ (µ).) This can be viewed as providing more motivation for the use of SLPS’s.
Proposition 4.3: If ~µ, ~µ′ ∈ SLPS(W,F), then ~µ ≈ ~µ′ iff ~µ = ~µ′.
The next result justifies restricting to finite LPS’s if the state space is finite. Given
an algebra F , let Basic(F) consist of the basic sets in F , that is, the nonempty sets
F that themselves contain no nonempty subsets in F . Clearly the sets in Basic(F) are
disjoint, so that |Basic(F)| ≤ |W |. If all sets are measurable, then Basic(F) consists of
the singleton subsets of W . If W is finite, it is easy to see that all sets in F are finite
unions of the sets in Basic(F).
Proposition 4.4: If W is finite, then every LPS over (W,F) is equivalent to an LPS
of length at most |Basic(F)|.
I can now define the bijection that relates NPS’s and LPS’s. Given (W,F), let
LPS (W,F)/≈ be the equivalence classes of ≈-equivalent LPS’s over (W,F); similarly,
let NPS (W,F)/≈ be the equivalence classes of ≈-equivalent NPS’s over (W,F). Note
that in NPS (W,F)/≈, it is possible that different nonstandard probability measures
could have different ranges. For this section, without loss of generality, I could also
fix the range of all NPS’s to be the nonstandard model IR(ǫ) discussed in Section 2.3.
However, in the infinite case, it is not possible to restrict to a single nonstandard model,
so I do not do so here either, for uniformity.
Now define the mapping FL→N from LPS (W,F)/≈ to NPS (W,F)/≈ pretty much as
suggested at the beginning of this subsection: If [~µ] is an equivalence class of LPS’s, then
choose a representative ~µ′ ∈ [~µ] with finite length. Fix an infinitesimal ǫ. Suppose that
~µ′ = (µ0, . . . , µk). Let FL→N([~µ]) = [(1− ǫ− · · · − ǫk)µ0 + ǫµ1 + · · ·+ ǫkµk].
Theorem 4.5: IfW is finite, then FL→N is a bijection from LPS(W,F)/≈ to NPS(W,F)/≈
that preserves equivalence (that is, each NPS in FL→N([~µ]) is equivalent to ~µ).
Proof: It is easy to check that if ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µk), then ~µ ≈ (1 − ǫ − · · · − ǫk)µ0 +
ǫµ1 + · · · + ǫkµk (see Lemma A.7 in the appendix for a formal proof). It follows that
FL→N is an injection from LPS (W,F)/≈ to NPS (W,F)/≈. To show that FL→N is a
surjection, we must essentially construct an inverse map; that is, given an NPS (W,F , ν)
where W is finite, we must find an LPS ~µ such that ~µ ≈ ν. The idea is to find a finite
collection µ0, . . . , µk of (standard) probability measures, where k ≤ |W |, and nonnegative
nonstandard reals ǫ0, . . . , ǫk such that st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0 and ν = ǫ0µ0 + · · · + ǫkµk. A
straightforward argument then shows that ν ≈ ~µ and FL→N([~µ]) = [ν]. I leave details to
the appendix.
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BBD [1991a] also relate nonstandard probability measures and LPS’s under the as-
sumption that the state space is finite, but there are some significant technical differences
between the way they relate them and the approach taken here. BBD prove representa-
tion theorems essentially showing that a preference order on lotteries can be represented
by a standard utility function on lotteries and an LPS iff it can be represented by a stan-
dard utility function on lotteries and an NPS. Thus, they show that NPS’s and LPS’s
are equiexpressive in terms of representing preference orders on lotteries. The difference
between BBD’s result and Theorem 4.5 is essentially a matter of quantification. BBD’s
result can be viewed as showing that, given an LPS, for each utility function on lotteries,
there is an NPS that generates the same preference order on lotteries for that particular
utility function. In principle, the NPS might depend on the utility function. More pre-
cisely, for a fixed LPS ~µ, all that follows from their result is that for each utility function
u, there is an NPS ν such that (~µ, u) and (ν, u) generate the same preference order on
lotteries. Theorem 4.5 says that, given ~µ, there is an NPS ν such that (~µ, u) and (ν, u)
generate the same preference on lotteries for all utility functions u.
4.2 The infinite case
An LPS over an infinite state spaceW may not be equivalent to any finite LPS. However,
ideas analogous to those used to prove Proposition 4.4 can be used to provide a bound
on the length of the minimal-length LPS’s in an equivalence class.
Proposition 4.6: Every LPS over (W,F) is equivalent to an LPS over (W,F) of length
at most |F|.
The first step in relating LPS’s to NPS’s is to show that, just as in the finite case,
for every LPS (µβ : β < α) of length α, there is an equivalent NPS ν. The idea will be
to set ν = (1 −∑0<β<α ǫnβ) +
∑
0<β<α ǫnβµβ. In the finite case, we could take nβ = β.
This worked because each β was finite, and the field IR(ǫ) includes ǫj for each integer
j. But now, since α may be greater than ω, we cannot just take nβ = β. To get this
idea to work in the infinite setting, I consider a nonstandard model of the integers, which
includes an “integer” corresponding to all the ordinals less than α. I then construct a
field that includes ǫnα even for these nonstandard integers nα.
A nonstandard model of the integers is a model that contains the integers and satisfies
every property of the integers expressible in first-order logic. It follows easily from the
compactness theorem of first-order logic [Enderton 1972] that, given an ordinal α, there
exists a nonstandard model Iα of the integers Iα that includes elements nβ , β < α,
such that nj = j for j < ω and nβ < nβ′ if β < β
′. (Note that since Iα satisfies all the
properties of the integers, it follows that if nβ < nβ′ , then nβ′−nβ ≥ 1, a fact that will be
useful later.) The compactness theorem says that, given a collection of formulas, if each
finite subset has a model, then so does the whole set. Consider a language with a function
+ and constant symbols for each integer, together with constants nβ, β < α. Consider
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the collection of first-order formulas in this language consisting of all the formulas true
of the integers, together with the formulas ni = i for i < ω and nβ < nβ′ , for all
β < β ′ < α. Clearly any finite subset of this set has a model—namely, the integers.
Thus, by compactness, so does the full set. Thus, for each ordinal α, there is a model Iα
with the required properties.
Given α, I now construct a field IR(Iα) that includes ǫn for each “integer” n ∈ Iα.
To explain the construction, it is best to first consider IR(ǫ) in a little more detail. Since
IR(ǫ) is a field, once it includes ǫ, it must include p(ǫ), where p is a polynomial with real
coefficients. To ensure the every nonzero element of IR(ǫ) has an inverse, we need not
just finite polynomials in ǫ, but infinite polynomials in ǫ. The inverse of a polynomial
in ǫ can then be computer using standard “formal” division of polynomials. Moreover,
the leading coefficient of the polynomial can be negative. Thus, the inverse of ǫ3 is, not
surprisingly, ǫ−3; the inverse of 1− ǫ is 1 + ǫ+ ǫ2 + . . ..
The field IR(Iα) also includes polynomials in ǫ, but now the exponents are not just
integers, but elements of Iα. Since a field is closed under multiplication, if it contains
ǫn1 and ǫn2 , it must also include their product. Since Iα satisfies all the properties of
the integers, if it includes n1 and n2, it also includes an element n1 + n2, and we can
take ǫn1 × ǫn2 = ǫn1+n2 . Formally, let IR(Iα) be the non-Archimedean model defined as
follows: IR(Iα) consists of all polynomials of the form
∑
n∈J rnǫ
n, where rn is a standard
real, ǫ is an infinitesimal, and J is a well-founded subset of Iα. (Recall that a set is
well founded if it has no infinite descending sequence; thus, the set of integers is not
well founded, since . . .− 3 < −2 < −1 is an infinite descending sequence. The reason I
require well foundedness will be clear shortly.) We can identify the standard real r with
the polynomial rǫ0.
The polynomials in IR(Iα) can be added and multiplied using the standard rules for
addition and multiplication of polynomials. It is easy to check that the result of adding
or multiplying two polynomials is another polynomial in IR(Iα). In particular, if p1 and
p2 are two polynomials, N1 is the set of exponents of p1, and N2 is the set of exponents
of p2, then the exponents of p1 + p2 lie in N1 ∪N2, while the exponents of p1p2 lie in the
set N3 = {n1 + n2 : n1 ∈ N1, n2 ∈ N2}. Both N1 ∪N2 and N3 are easily seen to be well
founded if N1 and N2 are. Moreover, for each expression n1+n2 ∈ N3, it follows from the
well-foundedness of N1 and N2 that there are only finitely many pairs (n, n
′) ∈ N1 ×N2
such that n+n′ = n1+n2, so the coefficient of ǫ
n1+n2 in p1p2 is well defined. Finally, each
polynomial (other than 0) has an inverse that can be computed using standard “formal”
division of polynomials; I leave the details to the reader. This step is where the well
foundedness comes in. The formal division process cannot be applied to a polynomial
with coefficients that are not well founded, such as · · · + ǫ−3 + ǫ−2 + ǫ−1. An element
of IR(Iα) is positive if its leading coefficient is positive. Define an order ≤ on IR(Iα) by
taking a ≤ b if b − a is positive. With these definitions, IR(Iα) is a non-Archimedean
field.
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Given (W,F), let α be the minimal ordinal whose cardinality is greater than or
equal to |F|. By construction, Iα has elements nβ for all β < α such that ni = i for
i < ω and nβ < nβ′ if β < β
′ < α. I now define a map FL→N from LPS (W,F)/≈
to NPS (W,F)/≈ just as suggested earlier. In more detail, given an equivalence class
[~µ] ∈ LPS (W,F), by Proposition 4.6, there exists ~µ′ ∈ [~µ] such that ~µ′ has length
α′ ≤ α. Let ν = (1−∑0<β<α ǫnβ)µ0 +
∑
0<β<α ǫnβµ
′
β. By definition,
∑
0<β<α ǫ
nβ ∈ IR(Iα)
(the set of exponents is well ordered since the ordinals are well ordered), hence so is
(1 − ∑0<β<α ǫnβ). The elements ǫnβ for β ≤ α are also all in IR(Iα). It easily follows
that ν is nonstandard probability measure over the field IR(Iα). As observed earlier, if
β ′ < β, then β − β ′ ≥ 1, so ǫn′β is infinitesimally smaller than ǫnβ . Arguments essentially
identical to those of Lemma A.7 in the appendix can be used to show that ν ≈ ~µ′. Define
FL→N [~µ] = [ν]. The following result is immediate.
Theorem 4.7: FL→N is an injection from LPS(W,F)/≈ to NPS(W,F)/≈ that preserves
equivalence.
What about the converse? Is it the case that for every NPS there is an equivalent
LPS? The technique for finding an equivalent LPS used in the finite case fails. There is no
obvious way to find a well-ordered sequence of standard probability measures µ0, µ1, . . .
and a sequence of nonnegative nonstandard reals ǫ0, ǫ1, . . . such that st (ǫβ+1/ǫβ) = 0 and
ν = ǫ0µ0 + ǫ1µ1 + · · ·. As the following example shows, this is not an accident. There
exists NPSs that are not equivalent to any LPS.
Example 4.8: As in Example 3.3, let W = IN , the natural numbers, let F consist of
the finite and cofinite subsets of IN , and let F ′ = F −{∅}. Let ν1 be an NPS with range
IR(ǫ), where ν1(U) = |U |ǫ if U is finite and ν1(U) = 1− |U |ǫ if U is cofinite (as usual, U
denotes the complement of U , which in this case is finite). This is clearly an NPS, and
it corresponds to the cps µ1 of Example 3.3, in the sense that st (ν1(V |U)) = µ1(V |U)
for all V ∈ F , U ∈ F ′. Just as in Example 3.3, it can be shown that there is no LPS ~µ
such that ν1 ≈ ~µ.
To see the potential relevance of this setup, suppose that a natural number is chosen
at random and, intuitively, all numbers are equally likely to be chosen. An agent may
place a bet on the number being in a finite or cofinite set. Intuitively, the agent should
prefer a bet on a set with larger cardinality. More precisely, if U1 and U2 are two sets in
the algebra, the agent should prefer a bet on U1 over a bet on U2 iff (a) U1 and U2 are
both cofinite and the complement of U1 has smaller cardinality than that of U2, (b) U1
is cofinite and U2 is finite, or (c) U1 and U2 are both finite, and U1 has larger cardinality
than U2. These preferences on acts or bets should translate to statements of likelihood.
The NPS captures these preferences directly; they cannot be captured in an LPS. The
cps of Example 3.3 captures (b) directly, and (c) indirectly: when conditioning on any
finite set that contains U1 ∪ U2, the probability of U1 will be higher than that of U2.
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4.3 Countably additive nonstandard probability measures
Do things get any better if countable additivity is required? To answer this ques-
tion, I must first make precise what countable additivity means in the context of non-
Archimedean fields. To understand the issue here, recall that for the standard real
numbers, every bounded nondecreasing sequence has a unique least upper bound, which
can be taken to be its limit. Given a countable sum each of whose terms is nonnega-
tive, the partial sums form a nondecreasing sequence. If the partial sums are bounded
(which they are if the terms in the sums represent the probabilities of a pairwise disjoint
collection of sets), then the limit is well defined.
None of the above is true in the case of non-Archimedean fields. For a trivial coun-
terexample, consider the sequence ǫ, 2ǫ, 3ǫ, . . .. Clearly this sequence is bounded (by any
positive real number), but it does not have a least upper bound. For a more subtle
example, consider the sequence 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, . . . in the field IR(ǫ). Should its limit be 1?
While this does not seem to be an unreasonable choice, note that 1 is not the least upper
bound of the sequence. For example, 1 − ǫ is greater than every term in the sequence,
and is less than 1. So are 1 − 3ǫ and 1 − ǫ2. Indeed, this sequence has no least upper
bound in IR(ǫ).
Despite these concerns, I define limits in IR(I∗) pointwise. That is, a sequence
a1, a2, a3, . . . in IR(I
∗) converges to b ∈ IR(I∗) if, for every n ∈ I∗, the coefficients of
ǫn in a1, a2, a3, . . . converge to the coefficient of ǫ
n in b. (Since the coefficients are stan-
dard reals, the notion of convergence for the coefficients is just the standard definition of
convergence in the reals. Of course, if ǫn does not appear explicitly, its coefficient is taken
to be 0.) Note that here and elsewhere I use the letters a and b (possibly with subscripts)
to denote (standard) reals, and ǫ to denote an infinitesimal. As usual,
∑∞
i=1 ai is taken to
be b if the sequence of partial sums
∑n
i=1 ai converges to b. Note that, with this notion of
convergence, 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, . . . converges to 1 even though 1 is not the least upper bound
of the sequence.6 I discuss the consequences of this choice further in Section 7.
With this notion of countable sum, it makes perfect sense to consider countably-
additive nonstandard probability measures. If F is a σ-algebra and LPS c(W,F) and
NPS c(W,F) denote the countably additive LPS’s and NPS’s on (W,F), respectively,
then Theorem 4.7 can be applied with no change in proof to show the following.
Theorem 4.9: FL→N is an injection from LPS
c(W,F)/≈ to NPSc(W,F)/≈.
However, as the following example shows, even with the requirement of countable
additivity, there are nonstandard probability measures that are not equivalent to any
LPS.
Example 4.10: Let W = {w1, w2, w3, . . .}, and let F = 2W . Choose any nonstandard
I∗ and fix an infinitesimal ǫ in IR(I∗). Define an NPS (W,F , ν) with range IR(I∗) by
6For those used to thinking of convergence in topological terms, what is going on here is that the
topology corresponding to this notion of convergence is not Hausdorff.
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taking ν(wj) = aj + bjǫ, where aj = 1/2
j, b2j−1 = 1/2
j−1, and b2j = −1/2j−1, for
j = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Thus, the probabilities of w1, w2, . . . are characterized by the sequence
1/2 + ǫ, 1/4 − ǫ, 1/8 + ǫ/2, 1/16 − ǫ/2, 1/32 + ǫ/4, . . .. For U ⊆ W , define ν(U) =∑
{j:wj∈U} aj + ǫ
∑
{j:wj∈U} bj . It is easy to see that these sums are well-defined. These
likelihoods correspond to preferences. For example, an agent should prefer a bet that
gives a payoff of 1 if w2 occurs and 0 otherwise to a bet that gives a payoff of 4 if w4
occurs and 0 otherwise. As I show in the appendix (see Proposition A.9), there is no
LPS ~µ over (W,F) such that ν ≈ ~µ.
Roughly speaking, the reason that ν is not equivalent to any LPS in Example 4.10
is that the ratio between aj and bj in the definition of ν (i.e., the ratio between the
“standard part” of ν(wj) and the “infinitesimal part” of ν(wj)) goes to zero. This can
be generalized so as to give a condition on nonstandard probability measures that is
necessary and sufficient to guarantee that they can be represented by an LPS. However,
the condition is rather technical and I have not found an interesting interpretation of it,
so I do not pursue it here.
5 Relating Popper Spaces to NPS’s
Consider the map FN→P from nonstandard probability spaces to Popper spaces such that
FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ), where F ′ = {U : ν(U) 6= 0} and µ(V |U) = st (ν(V |U))
for V ∈ F , U ∈ F ′. I leave it to the reader to check that (W,F ,F ′, µ) is indeed a Popper
space. This is arguably the most natural map; for example, it is easy to check that
FN→P ◦ FS→N = FS→P , where FS→N is the restriction of FL→N to SLPSs. (Note that
FL→N is well-defined on SLPS’s, since if ~µ is an SLPS, by Proposition 4.3, [~µ] = {~µ}.)
We might hope that FN→P is a bijection from NPS (W,F)/≈ to Pop(W,F). As I
show shortly, it is not. To understand FL→N better, define an equivalence relation ≃ on
NPS (W,F) (and NPS c(W,F)) by taking ν1 ≃ ν2 if {U : ν1(U) = 0} = {U : ν2(U) = 0}
and st (ν1(V |U)) = st (ν2(V |U)) for all V, U such that ν1(U) 6= 0. Thus, ≃ essentially
says that infinitesimal differences between conditional probabilities do not count. Let
NPS/ ≃ (resp., NPS c/ ≃) consist of the ≃ equivalence classes in NPS (resp., NPS c).
Clearly FN→P is well defined as a map from NPS/≃ to Pop(W,F) and from NPS c/≃ to
Popc(W,F). As the following result shows, FN→P is actually a bijection from NPS c/≃
to Popc(W,F).
Theorem 5.1: FN→P is a bijection from NPS(W,F)/≃ to Pop(W,F) and from NPSc(W,F)/≃
to Popc(W,F).
Proof: It is easy to see that FN→P is an injection. In the countable case, the inverse
map can be defined using earlier results. If (W,F ,F ′, µ) ∈ Popc(W,F), by Theorem 3.5,
there is a countably additive SLPS ~µ′ such that FS→P ((W,F , ~µ′)) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). By
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Theorem 4.7, there is some (W,F , ν) ∈ NPS c(W,F) such that ν ≈ ~µ′. It is not hard
to show that FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ); see the appendix for details. Showing that
FN→P is a surjection in the finitely additive case requires more work; again, see the
appendix for details.
McGee [1994] proves essentially the same result as Theorem 5.1 in the case that F is
an algebra (and the measures involved are not necessarily countably additive). McGee
[1994, p. 181] says that his result shows that “these two approaches amount to the same
thing”. However, this is far from clear. The ≃ relation is rather coarse. In particular, it
is coarser than ≈.
Proposition 5.2: If ν1 ≈ ν2 then ν1 ≃ ν2.
The converse of Proposition 5.2 does not hold in general. As a result, the ≃ relation
identifies nonstandard measures that behave quite differently in decision contexts. This
difference already arises in finite spaces, as the following example shows.
Example 5.3: Suppose W = {w1, w2}. Consider the nonstandard probability measure
ν1 such that ν1(w1) = 1/2+ǫ and ν1(w2) = 1/2−ǫ. (This is equivalent to the LPS (µ1, µ2)
where µ1(w1) = µ2(w2) = 1/2, µ2(w1) = 1, and µ2(w2) = 0.) Let ν2 be the nonstandard
probability measure such that ν2(w1) = ν2(w2) = 1/2. Clearly ν1 ≃ ν2. However, it is
not the case that ν1 ≈ ν2. Consider the two random variables χ{w1} and χ{w2}. (I use
the notation χU to denote the indicator function for U ; that is, χU(w) = 1 if w ∈ U and
χU(w) = 0 otherwise.) According to ν1, the expected value of χ{w1} is (very slightly)
higher than that of χ{w2}. According to ν2, χ{w1} and χ{w2} have the same expected
value. Thus, ν1 6≈ ν2. Moreover, it is easy to see that there is no Popper measure µ on
{w1, w2} that can make the same distinctions with respect to χ{w1} and χ{w2} as ν1, no
matter how we define expected value with respect to a Popper measure. According to
ν1, although the expected value of χ{w1} is higher than that of χ{w2}, the expected value
of χ{w1} is less than that of αχ{w2} for any (standard) real α > 1. There is no Popper
measure with this behavior.
More generally, in finite spaces, Theorem 3.1 shows that Popper spaces are equivalent
to SLPS’s, while Theorem 4.5 shows that LPS (W,F)/≈ is equivalent to NPS (W,F)/≈.
By Proposition 4.3, SLPS (W,F)/≈ is essentially identical to SLPS (W,F) (all the equiv-
alence classes in SLPS (W,F)/≈ are singletons), so in finite spaces, the gap in expres-
sive power between Popper spaces and NPS’s essentially amounts to the gap between
SLPS (W,F) and LPS (W,F)/≈. This gap is nontrivial. For example, there is no SLPS
equivalent to the LPS (µ1, µ2) that represents the NPS in Example 5.3.
6 Independence
The notion of independence is fundamental. As I show in this section, the results of
the previous sections sheds light on various notions of independence considered in the
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literature for LPS’s and (variants of) cps’s. I first consider independence for events and
then independence for random variables. I then relate my definitions to those of BBD,
Hammond, and Kohlberg and Reny [1997].
Intuitively, event U is independent of V if learning U gives no information about
V . Certainly if learning U gives no information about V , then if µ is an arbitrary
probability measure, we would expect that µ(V |U) = µ(V ). Indeed, this is often taken
as the definition of V being independent of U with respect to µ. If standard probability
measures are used, conditioning is not defined if µ(U) = 0. In this case, U is still
considered independent of V . As is well known, if U is independent of V , then µ(U∩V ) =
µ(V )× µ(U) and V is independent of U , that is, µ(U | V ) = µ(U). Thus, independence
of events with respect to a probability measure can be defined in any of three equivalent
ways. Unfortunately, these definitions are not equivalent for other representations of
uncertainty (see [Halpern 2003, Chapter 4] for a general discussion of this issue).
The situation is perhaps simplest for nonstandard probability measures.7 In this
case, the three notions coincide, for exactly the same reasons as they do for standard
probability measures. However, independence is perhaps too strong a notion in some
ways. In particular, nonstandard measures that are equivalent do not in general agree
on independence, as the following example shows.
Example 6.1: Suppose that W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Let νi(w1) = 1 − 2ǫ + ǫi, νi(w2) =
νi(w3) = ǫ− ǫi, and νi(w4) = ǫi, for i = 1, 2, where ǫ1 = ǫ2 and ǫ2 = ǫ3. If U = {w2, w4}
and V = {w3, w4}, then νi(U) = νi(V ) = ǫ and νi(U ∩ V ) = ǫi. It follows U and V are
independent with respect to ν1, but not with respect to ν2. However, it is easy to check
that ν1 ≈ ν2.
Example 6.1 shows that independence of events in the context of nonstandard mea-
sures is very sensitive to the choice of ǫ, even if this choice does not affect decision
making at all. This suggests the following definition: U is approximately independent of
V with respect to ν if ν(U) 6= 0 implies that ν(V |U) − ν(V ) is infinitesimal, that is,
if st (ν(V |U)) = st (ν(V )). Note that U can be approximately independent of V with-
out V being approximately independent of U . For example, consider the nonstandard
probability measure ν1 from Example 6.1. Let V
′ = {w4}; as before, let U = {w2, w4}.
It is easy to check that st (ν1(V
′ |U)) = st (ν1(V ′)) = 0, but st (ν1(U | V ′)) = 1, while
st (ν1(U)) = 0. Thus, U is approximately independent of V
′ with respect to ν1, but V
′
is not approximately independent of U . Similarly, U can be approximately independent
of V without U being approximately independent of V . For example, it is easy to check
that V
′
is approximately independent of U with respect to ν1, although V
′ is not.
A straightforward argument shows that U is approximately independent of V with
respect to ν iff ν(U) 6= 0 implies st ((ν(V ∩ U)− ν(V )× ν(U))/ν(U)) = 0, while V is
7Although I talk about U being independent of V with respect to a nonstandard measure ν, technically
I should talk about U being independent of V with respect to an NPS (W,F , ν), for U, V ∈ F . I continue
to be sloppy at times, reverting to more careful notation when necessary.
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approximately independent of U with respect to ν iff the same statement holds with
the roles of V and U reversed. Note for future reference that each of these require-
ments is stronger than just requiring that st (ν(V ∩ U)− ν(V )× ν(U)) = 0. The latter
requirement is automatically met, for example, if the probability of either U or V is
infinitesimal.
The definition of (approximate) independence extends in a straightforward way to
(approximate) conditional independence. U is conditionally independent of V given V ′
with respect to a (standard or nonstandard) probability measure ν if ν(U∩V ′) 6= 0 implies
ν(V |U ∩ V ′) = ν(V | V ′). Again, for probability, U is conditionally independent of V
given V ′ iff V is conditionally independent of U given V ′ iff ν(V ∩ U | V ′) = ν(V | V ′)×
ν(U | V ′). U is approximately conditionally independent of V given V ′ with respect to
ν if st (ν(V |U ∩ V ′)) = st (ν(V | V ′)). If V ′ is taken to be W , the whole space, then
(approximate) conditional independence reduces to (approximate) independence.
The following proposition shows that, although independence is not preserved by
equivalence, approximate independence is.
Proposition 6.2: If U is approximately conditionally independent of V given V ′ with
respect to ν, and ν ≈ ν ′, then U is approximately conditionally independent of V given
V ′ with respect to ν ′.
Proof: Suppose that ν ≈ ν ′. I claim that for all events U1 and U2 such that ν1(U2) 6= 0,
st (ν(U1)/ν(U2)) = st (ν
′(U1)/ν
′(U2)). For suppose that st (ν(U1)/ν(U2)) = α. Then it
easily follows that Eν(χU1) < Eν(α
′χU2) for all α
′ > α, and Eν(χU1) > Eν(α
′′χU2) for all
α′′ < α. Thus, the same must be true for Eν′ , and hence st (ν
′(U1)/ν
′(U2)) = α. It thus
follows that st (ν(V |U ∩ V ′)) = st (ν ′(V |U ∩ V ′)) and st (ν(V | V ′)) = st (ν ′(V | V ′)),
from which the result is immediate.
There is an obvious definition of independence for events for Popper spaces: U is
independent of V given V ′ with respect to the Popper space (W,F ,F ′, µ) if U ∩ V ′ ∈ F ′
implies that µ(V |U ∩ V ′) = µ(V | V ′); if U ∩ V ′ /∈ F ′, then U is also taken to be
independent of V given V ′. If U is independent of V given V ′ and V ′ ∈ F ′, then
µ(U ∩ V | V ′) = µ(U | V ′) × µ(V | V ′). However, the converse does not necessarily hold.
Nor is it the case that if U is independent of V given V ′ then V is independent of U
given V ′. A counterexample can be obtained by taking the Popper space arising from
the NPS in Example 6.1. Consider the Popper space (W, 2W ,F ′, µ) corresponding to the
NPS (W, 2W , ν1) via the bijection FN→P . It is easy to check that U is independent of V
′
but V ′ is not independent of U with respect to this Popper space, although µ(V ′ ∩U) =
µ(U | V ′) × µ(V ′) (= 0). This observation is an instance of the following more general
result, which is almost immediate from the definitions:
Proposition 6.3: U is approximately independent of V given V ′ with respect to the
NPS (W,F , ν) iff U is independent of V given V ′ with respect to the Popper space
FN→P (W,F , ν).
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How should independence be defined in LPS’s? Interestingly, neither BBD nor Ham-
mond define independence directly for LPS’s. However, they do give definitions in terms
of NPS’s that can be applied to equivalent LPS’s; indeed, BBD [1991b] do just this (see
the discussion of BBD strong independence below).
I now consider independence for random variables. If X is a random variable on W ,
let V(X) denote range (set of possible values) of random variable X ; that is, V(X) =
{X(w) : w ∈ W}. Recall that I am assuming that all random variables have countable
range. Random variable X is independent of Y with respect to a standard probability
measure µ if the event X = x is independent of the event Y = y with respect to µ, for all
x ∈ V(X) and y ∈ V(Y ). By analogy, for nonstandard probability measures, following
Kohlberg and Reny [1997], define X and Y to be weakly independent with respect to ν if
X = x is approximately independent of Y = y and Y = y is approximately independent
of X = x with respect to ν for all x ∈ V(X) and y ∈ V(Y ).8
For standard probability measures, it easily follows that if X is independent of Y ,
then X ∈ U1 is independent of Y ∈ V1 conditional on Y ∈ V2 and Y ∈ V1 is independent
of X ∈ U1 conditional on X ∈ U2, for all U1, U2 ⊆ V(X) and V1, V2 ⊆ V(Y ). The same
arguments show that this is also true for for nonstandard probability measures. However,
the argument breaks down for approximate independence.
Example 6.4: Suppose that W = {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2}. Let X and Y be the random
variables that project onto the first and second components of a world, respectively, so
that X(i, j) = i and Y (i, j) = j. Let ν be the nonstandard probability measure on W
given by the following table:
Y = 1 Y = 2
X = 1 1− 3ǫ− 3ǫ2 ǫ
X = 2 ǫ ǫ2
X = 3 ǫ 2ǫ2
It is easy to check that X and Y are weakly independent with respect to ν, for all
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {2, 3}. However, st (ν(X = 2 |X ∈ {2, 3} ∩ Y = 2)) = 1/3, while
st (ν(X = 2 |X ∈ {2, 3})) = 1/2.
In light of this example, I define X to be approximately independent of {Y1, . . . , Yn}
with respect to ν if X ∈ U1 is approximately independent of (Y1 ∈ V1) ∩ . . . ∩ (Yn ∈ Vn)
conditional on (Y1 ∈ V ′1) ∩ . . . ∩ (Yn ∈ V ′n) with respect to ν for all U1 ⊆ V(X), Vi, V ′i ⊆
V(Yi), and i = 1, . . . , n. X1, . . . , Xn are approximately independent with respect to ν if Xi
8Kohlberg and Reny’s definition of weak independence also requires that the joint range of X and Y
be the product of the individual ranges. That is, for X and Y to be weakly independent, it must be the
case that for all x ∈ V(X) and y ∈ V(Y ), there exists some w ∈ W such that X(w) = x and Y (w) = y.
Of course, this requirement could also be added to the definition I am proposing here; adding it would
not affect any of the results of this paper.
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is approximately independent of {X1, . . . , Xn}−{Xi} with respect to ν for i = 1, . . . , n. I
leave to the reader the obvious extensions to conditional independence and the analogues
of this definition for Popper spaces and LPS’s.
As I said, BBD consider three notions of independence for random variables. One
is a decision-theoretic notion of stochastic independence on preference relations on acts
over W . Under appropriate assumptions, it can be shown that a preference relation is
stochastically independent iff it can be represented by some (real-valued) utility function
u and a nonstandard probability measure ν such that X1, . . . , Xn are approximately
independent with respect to ν [Battigalli and Veronesi 1996]. A second notion they
consider is a weak notion of product measure that requires only that there exist measures
ν1, . . . , νn such that st ((ν(w1, . . . , wn)) = st (ν1(w1)× · · ·ν(wn)). As we have already
observed, this notion of independence is rather weak. Indeed, an example in BBD shows
that it misses out on some interesting decision-theoretic behavior.
The third notion of independence that BBD consider is the strongest. BBD [1991b]
define X1, . . . , Xn to be strongly independent with respect to an LPS ~µ if they are in-
dependent (in the usual sense) with respect to an NPS ν such that µ ≈ ν.9 Moreover,
they give a characterization of this notion of strong independence, which I henceforth call
BBD strong independence, to distinguish it from the KR notion of strong independence
that I discuss shortly. Given a tuple ~r = (r0, . . . , rk−1) of vectors of reals in (0, 1)k and a
finite LPS ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µk), let ~µ✷~r be the (standard) probability measure
(1− r0)µ0 + r0[(1− r1)µ1 + r1[(1− r2)µ2 + r2[· · ·+ rk−2[(1− rk−1)µk−1 + rk−1µk)] . . .]]].
Note that ~µ✷~r is defined only if ~µ is finite. Thus, in discussing BBD strong independence,
I restrict to finite LPS’s. In addition, for technical reasons that will become clear in the
proof of Theorem 6.5, I consider only random variables with finite range, which is what
BBD do as well. BBD [1991b, p. 90] claim without proof that “it is straightforward to
show” that X1, . . . , Xn are BBD strongly independent with respect to ~µ iff there is a
sequence ~rj , j = 1, 2, . . . of vectors in (0, 1)k such that ~rj → (0, . . . , 0) as j → ∞, and
X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ~µ✷~r
j for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .. I can prove this
result only if the NPS ν such that ~µ ≈ ν and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect
to ν has a range that is an elementary extension of the reals (and thus has the same
first-order properties as the reals).
Theorem 6.5: There exists an NPS ν whose range is an elementary extension of the
reals such that ~µ ≈ ν and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ν iff there exists a
sequence ~rj, j = 1, 2, . . . of vectors in (0, 1)k such that ~rj → (0, . . . , 0) as j → ∞, and
X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ~µ✷~r
j for j = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
9In [Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991b], BBD say that this definition of strong independence
is given in [Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991a]. However, the definition appears to be given only
in terms of NPS’s in [Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991a].
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I do not know if this result holds without requiring that ν be an elementary extension of
the reals.
Kohlberg and Reny [1997] define a notion of strong independence with respect to what
they call relative probability spaces, which are closely related to Popper spaces of the form
(W, 2W , 2W−{∅}, µ), where all subsets ofW are measurable and it is possible to condition
on all nonempty sets. Their definition is similar in spirit to the characterization of BBD
strong independence given in Theorem 6.5. For ease of exposition, I recast their definition
in terms of Popper spaces. X1, . . . , Xn are KR-strongly independent with respect to the
Popper space (W,F ,F ′, µ), where F ′ includes all events of the formXi = x for x ∈ V(Xi),
if there exist a sequence of standard probability measures µ1, µ2, . . . such that µj → µ,
and for all j = 1, 2, 3, . . ., µj(U) > 0 for U ∈ F ′ and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with
respect to µj. As Kohlberg and Reny show, KR-strong independence implies approximate
independence10 and is, in general, strictly stronger.
The following theorem characterizes KR strong independence in terms of NPS’s.
Theorem 6.6: X1, . . . , Xn are KR-strongly independent with respect to the Popper space
(W,F ,F ′, µ) iff there exists an NPS (W,F , ν) such that FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ)
and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to (W,F , ν).
It follows from the proof that we can require the range of ν to be a nonelementary
extension of the reals, but this is not necessary.
Kohlberg and Reny show that their notions of weak and strong independence can be
used to characterize Kreps and Wilson’s [1982] notion of sequential equilibrium. BBD
[1991b] use their notion of strong independence in their characterization of perfect equi-
librium and proper equilibrium for games with more than two players. Finally, Battigali
[Battigalli 1996] uses approximate independence (or, equivalently, independence in cps’s)
to characterize sequential equilibrium.
7 Discussion
As the preceding discussion shows, there is a sense in which NPS’s are more general
than both Popper spaces and LPS’s. It would be of interest to get a natural charac-
terization of those NPS’s that are equivalent to Popper spaces and LPS’s; this remains
an open problem. LPS’s are more expressive than Popper measures in finite spaces and
in infinite spaces where we assume countable additivity (in the sense discussed at the
end of Section 5), but without assuming countable additivity, they are incomparable, as
Examples 3.3 and 3.4 show. Since all of these approaches to representing uncertainty
have been using in characterizing solution concepts in extensive-form games and notions
10They actually show only that it implies weak independence, but the same argument shows that it
implies approximate independence.
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of admissibility, the results here suggest that it is worth considering the extent to which
these results depend on the particular representation used.
It is worth stressing here that this notion of equivalence depends on the fact that
I have been viewing cps’s, LPS’s, and NPS’s as representations of uncertainty. But,
as Asheim [2006] emphasizes, they can also be viewed as representations of conditional
preferences. Example 5.3 shows that, even in finite spaces, NPS’s and LPS’s can express
preferences that cps’s cannot. However, as Asheim and Perea [2005] point out, in finite
spaces, cps’s can also represent conditional preferences that cannot be represented by
LPS’s and NPS’s. See [Asheim 2006] for a detailed discussion of the expressive power of
these representations with respect to conditional preferences.
Although NPS’s are the most expressive of the three approaches I have considered,
they have some disadvantages. In particular, working with a nonstandard probability
measure requires defining and working with a non-Archimedean field. LPS’s have the
advantage of using just standard probability measures. Moreover, their lexicographic
structure may give useful insights. It seems to be worth considering the extent to which
LPS’s can be generalized so as to increase their expressive power. In particular, it may
be of interest to consider LPS’s indexed by partially ordered and not necessarily well-
founded sets, rather than just LPS’s indexed by the ordinals. For example, Branden-
burger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008] characterize n rounds of iterated deletion using
finite LPS’s, for any n. Rather than using a sequence of (finite) LPS’s of different lengths
to characterize (unbounded) iterated deletion, it seems that a result similar in spirit can
be obtained using a single LPS indexed by the (positive and negative) integers.
I conclude with a brief discussion of a few other issues raised by this paper.
• Belief: The connections between LPS’s, NPS’s, and cps’s are relevant to the notion
of belief. There are two standard notions of belief that can be defined in LPS’s. Say
that U is a certain belief in LPS ~µ of length α if µβ(U) = 1 for all β < α; U is weakly
believed if µ0(U) = 1. Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008] defined a
third notion of belief, intermediate between weak and strong belief, and provided an
elegant decision-theoretic justification of it. According to their definition, an agent
assumes U in ~µ if there is some β < α such that (a) µβ′(U) = 1 for all β
′ ≤ β,
(b) µβ′′(U) = 0 for all β
′′ > β, and (c) U ⊆ ∪β′≤βSupp(µβ′), where Supp(µβ′)
denotes the support of the probability measure µβ′. (Condition (c) is unnecessary
if W is finite, given Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler’s assumption that
W = ∪β′Supp(µβ′).) There are straightforward analogues of certain belief and weak
belief in Popper spaces. U is strongly believed in a Popper space (W,F ,F ′, µ) if
µ(U | V ) = 1 for all V ∈ F ′; U is weakly believed if µ(U | V ) = 1 for all V ∈ F ′
such that µ(V ) > 0. Analogues of this notion of assumption have been considered
elsewhere in the literature. Van Fraassen [1995] independently defined a notion of
belief using Popper spaces; in a finite state space, an event is what van Fraassen
calls a belief core iff it is assumed in the sense of Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and
Keisler. Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s [2002] notion of strong belief is also essentially
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equivalent. Assumption also corresponds to Stalnaker’s [1998] notion of absoutely
robust belief and Asheim and Søvik’s [2005] notion of robust belief. Asheim and
Søvik [2005] do a careful comparison of all these notions (and others).
It is easy to define analogues of certain and weak belief in NPS’s: U is certain belief
if ν(U) = 1; U is weakly believed if st (ν(U)) = 1. The results of this paper suggest
that it may also be worth investigating an analogue of assumption in NPS’s.
• Nonstandard utility: In this paper, while I have allowed probabilities to be lexi-
cographically ordered or nonstandard, I have implicitly assumed that utilities are
standard real numbers (since I have restricted to real-valued random variables).
There is a tradition in decision theory going back to Hausner [1954] and continued
recently in a sequence of papers by Fishburn and Lavalle (see [Fishburn and Lavalle
1998] and the references therein) and Hammond [1999] of considering nonstandard
or lexicographically-ordered utilities. I have not considered the relationship be-
tween these ideas and the ones considered here, but there may be some fruitful
connections.
• Countable additivity for NPS’s: Countable additivity for standard probability mea-
sures is essentially a continuity condition. The fact that
∑∞
i=1 ai may not be the
least upper bound of the partial sums
∑n
i=1 ai in an NPS leads to a certain lack
of continuity in decision-making. For example, let W = {w1, w2, . . .}. Consider a
nonstandard probability measure ν such that ν(w1) = 1/3 − ǫ, ν(w2) = 1/3 + ǫ,
and ν(wk+2) = 1/(3 × 2k), for k = 1, 2, . . .. Let Un = {w3, . . . , wn} and let
U∞ = {w3, w4, . . .}. Clearly ν(Un) → ν(U∞) = 1/3. However, ν(Un) < ν(w1)
for all n. Thus, Eν(χ{w1}) > Eν(χUn) for all n ≥ 3 although Eν(χ{w1}) < Eν(χU∞).
Not surprisingly, the same situations can be modeled with LPS’s. Consider the LPS
(µ1, µ2), where µ1 = st (ν), µ2(w1) = 0, µ2(w2) = 2/3, and µ2(wk+2) = 1/(3 × 2k)
for k = 1, 2, . . .. It is easy to see that again E~µ(χ{w1}) > E~µ(χUn) for all n ≥ 3
although E~µ(χ{w1}) < Eν(χU∞). (A similar example can be obtained using SLPS’s,
by replacing each world wi by a pair of worlds w
′
i, w
′′
i , where w
′
i is in the support
of µ1 and w
′′
i is in the support of µ2.)
An analogous continuity problem arises even in finite domains. LetW = {w1, w2, w3}
and consider a sequence of probability measures νn such that νn(w1) = 1/3− 1/n,
νn(w2) = 1/3− ǫ and ν(w3) = 1/3 + 1/n+ ǫ. Clearly νn → ν, where ν(w1) = 1/3,
ν(w2) = 1/3 − ǫ, and ν(w3) = 1/3 + ǫ. However, νn(χ{w1}) < νn(χ{w2}) for all n,
while ν(χ{w1}) > ν(χ{w2}). Again, the same situation can be modeled using LPS’s
(and even SLPS’s).
Of course, continuity plays a significant role in standard axiomatizations of SEU,
and is vital in proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium. None of the uses of
continuity that I am familiar with have the specific form of this example, but I
believe it is worth considering further the impact of this lack of continuity.
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A Appendix: Proofs
In this section, I prove all the results claimed in the main part of the paper. For the
convenience of the reader, I repeat the statements of the results.
Theorem 3.1: IfW is finite and (F ,F ′), then FS→P is a bijection from SLPS(W,F ,F ′)
to Pop(W,F ,F ′).
Proof: The first step is to show that FS→P is an injection. If ~µ, ~µ
′ ∈ SLPS (W,F ,F ′) and
~µ 6= ~µ′, let µ = FS→P (W,F , ~µ), and let µ′ = FS→P (W,F , ~µ′). Let i be the least index
such that µi 6= µ′i. There is some set U such that µi(U) 6= µ′i(U). Let Ui be the set such
µi(Ui) = 1 and µj(Ui) = 0 for j < i; since ~µ is an SLPS, such a set Ui exists. Similarly, let
U ′i be such that µ
′
i(Ui) = 1 and µ
′
j(Ui) = 0 for j < i. Since µj = µ
′
j for all j < i, we must
have µj(Ui ∪U ′i) = µj(Ui ∪U ′i) = 0 for all j < i. Clearly ~µ(Uj ∪U ′j) > 0, so Uj ∪U ′j ∈ F ′.
Moreover, µ(U |Ui ∪ U ′i) = µi(U |Ui ∪ U ′i) = µi(U). Similarly, µ′(U |Ui ∪ U ′i) = µ′i(U).
Hence, µ 6= µ′.
To show that FS→P is a surjection, given a cps µ, let ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µk) be the LPS
constructed in the main text. We must show that FS→P (~µ) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). Suppose
that FS→P (~µ) = (W,F ,F ′′, µ′). I first show that F ′ = F ′′. Suppose that V ∈ F ′′. Then
µi(V ) > 0 for some i. Thus, µ(V |Ui) > 0. Since Ui ∈ F ′, it follows that V ∈ F ′. Thus,
F ′′ ⊆ F ′.
To show that F ′ ⊆ F ′′, first note that, by construction, µ(Uj |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1) = 1.
It easily follows that if V ⊆ U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1 then
µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1) = µ(V ∩ Uj |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1).
Thus, by CP3,
µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1) = µ(V ∩ Uj |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1) = µ(V |Uj)× µ(Uj |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1),
so
µ(V |Uj) = µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uj−1). (1)
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Now suppose that V ∈ F ′. Clearly V ∩ (U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uk) 6= ∅, for otherwise V ⊆
U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uk, contradicting the fact that U0 ∪ . . . ∪ Uk /∈ F ′. Let jV be the small-
est index j such that V ∩ Uj 6= ∅. I claim that µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) 6= 0. For if
µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) = 0, then µ(UjV−V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) = 1, contradicting the defi-
nition of UjV as the smallest set U
′ such that µ(U ′ |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) = 1. Moreover, since
V ⊆ U0 ∪ . . . UjV −1, it follows from (1) that µ(V |UjV ) = µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) > 0.
Thus, µjV (V ) > 0, so V ∈ F ′′.
This argument can be extended to show that µ(V ′ | V ) = µ′(V ′ | V ) for all V ′ ∈
F . Since V ∩ Ui = ∅ for i < jV , it follows that µ′(V ′ | V ) = µjV (V ′ | V ). By CP3,
µ(V ′ | V ) × µ(V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1) = µ(V ′ ∩ V |U0 ∪ . . . ∪ UjV −1). By (1) and the fact
that µ(V |UjV ) > 0, it follows that µ(V ′ | V ) = µ(V ′ ∩ V |UjV )/µ(V |UjV ), that is, that
µ(V ′ | V ) = µjV (V ′ | V ).
Although Theorem 3.5 was proved by Spohn [1986], I include a proof here as well, to
make the paper self-contained.
Theorem 3.5: For all W , the map FS→P is a bijection from SLPS
c(W,F ,F ′) to
Popc(W,F ,F ′).
Proof: Again, the difficulty comes in showing that FS→P is onto. As it says in the main
text, given a Popper space (W,F ,F ′, µ), the idea is to construct sets U0, U1, . . . and an
LPS ~µ such that µβ(V ) = µ(V |Uβ), and show that FS→P (W,F , ~µ) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). The
construction is somewhat involved.
As a first step, put an order ≤ on sets in F ′ by defining U ≤ V if µ(U |U ∪ V ) > 0.
(Essentially, the same order is considered by van Fraassen [1976].)
Lemma A.1: ≤ is transitive.
Proof: By definition, if U ≤ V and V ≤ V ′, then µ(U |U∪V ) > 0 and µ(V | V ∪V ′) > 0.
To see that µ(U |U ∪V ′) > 0, note that µ(U |U ∪V ∪V ′)+µ(V |U ∪V ∪V ′)+µ(V ′ |U ∪
V ∪V ′) = 1, so at least one of µ(U |U ∪V ∪V ′), µ(V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′), or µ(V ′ |U ∪V ∪V ′)
is positive. I consider each of the cases separately.
Case 1: Suppose that µ(U |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0. By CP3,
µ(U |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) = µ(U |U ∪ V ′)× µ(U ∪ V ′ |U ∪ V ∪ V ′).
Thus, µ(U |U ∪ V ′) > 0, as desired.
Case 2: Suppose that µ(V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0. By assumption, µ(U |U ∪ V ) > 0; since
µ(V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0, it follows that µ(U ∪ V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0. Thus, by CP3,
µ(U |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) = µ(U |U ∪ V )× µ(U ∪ V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0.
Thus, case 2 can be reduced to case 1.
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Case 3: Suppose that µ(V ′ |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0. By assumption, µ(V | V ∪ V ′) > 0; since
µ(V ′ |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0, it follows that µ(V ∪ V ′ |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0. Thus, by CP3,
µ(V |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) = µ(V | V ∪ V ′)× µ(V ∪ V ′ |U ∪ V ∪ V ′) > 0.
Thus, case 3 can be reduced to case 2.
This completes the proof, showing that ≤ is transitive.
Define U ∼ V if U ≤ V and V ≤ U .
Lemma A.2: ∼ is an equivalence relation on F ′.
Proof: It is immediate from the definition that ∼ is reflexive and symmetric; transitivity
follows from the transitivity of ≤.
Re´nyi [1956] and van Fraassen [1976] also considered the ∼ relation in their papers,
and the argument that ≤ is transitive is similar in spirit to Re´nyi’s argument that ∼ is
transitive. However, the rest of this proof diverges from those of Re´nyi and van Fraassen.
Let [U ] denote the ∼-equivalence class of U , and let F ′/∼= {[U ] : U ∈ F ′}.
Lemma A.3: Each equivalence class [V ] ∈ F ′/∼ is closed under countable unions.
Proof: Suppose that V1, V2, . . . ∈ [V ]. I must show that ∪∞i=1Vi ∈ [V ]. Clearly Vj ≤
∪∞i=1Vi for all j. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that ∪∞i=1Vi 6≤ Vj for some j. Since ≤
is transitive, it follows that Vj < ∪∞i=1Vi for all j. Thus, µ(Vj | ∪∞i=1 Vi) = 0 for all j. But
then, by countable additivity,
1 = µ(∪∞i=1Vi | ∪∞i=1 Vi) ≤
∞∑
j=1
µ(Vj | ∪∞i=1 Vi) = 0,
a contradiction. Thus, [V ] is closed under countable unions.
Fix an element V0 ∈ [V ].
Lemma A.4: inf{µ(V0 | V0 ∪ V ′) : V ′ ∈ [V ]} > 0.
Proof: Suppose that inf{µ(V0 | V0 ∪ V ′) : V ′ ∈ [V ]} = 0. Then there exist sets V1, V2, . . .
such that µ(V0 | V0∪Vn) < 1/n. Since [V ] is closed under countable unions, ∪ni=1Vi ∈ [V ].
Since V0 ∼ ∪ni=1Vi, it follows that µ(V0 | ∪∞i=0 Vi) > 0. But, by CP3,
µ(V0 | ∪∞i=0 Vi) = µ(V0 | V0 ∪ Vn)× µ(V0 ∪ Vn | ∪∞i=0 Vi) ≤ µ(V0 | V0 ∪ Vn) ≤ 1/n.
Since this is true for all n > 0, it follows that µ(V0 | ∪∞i=0 Vi) = 0, a contradiction.
The next lemma shows that each equivalence class in F ′/∼ has a “maximal element”.
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Lemma A.5: In each equivalence class [V ], there is an element V ∗ ∈ [V ] such that
µ(V ∗ | V ′ ∪ V ∗) = 1 for all V ′ ∈ [V ].
Proof: Again, fix an element V0 ∈ [V ]. By Lemma A.4, there exists some αV > 0 such
that inf{µ(V0 | V0 ∪ V ′) : V ′ ∈ [V ]} = αV . Thus, there exist sets V1, V2, V3, . . . ∈ [V ] such
that µ(V0 | V0 ∪ Vn) < α + 1/n. By Lemma A.3, V ∗ = ∪∞i=0Vi ∈ [V ]. By CP3,
µ(V0 | V ∗) = µ(V0 | V0 ∪ Vn)× µ(V0 ∪ Vn | V ∗) ≤ µ(V0 | V0 ∪ Vn) < αV + 1/n.
Thus, µ(V0 | V ∗) ≤ αV . By choice of αV , it follows that µ(V0 | V ∗) = αV .
Suppose that µ(V ∗ | V ′ ∪ V ∗) < 1 for some V ′ ∈ [V ]. But then, by CP3,
µ(V0 | V ′ ∪ V ∗) = µ(V0 | V ∗)× µ(V ∗ | V ′ ∪ V ∗) < αV ,
contradicting the choice of αV . Thus, µ(V
∗ | V ′ ∪ V ∗) = 1 for all V ′ ∈ [V ].
Define a total order on these equivalence relations by taking [U ] ≤ [V ] if U ′ ≤ V ′
for some U ′ ∈ [U ] and V ′ ∈ [V ]. It is easy to check (using the transitivity of ≤) that if
U ′ ≤ V ′ for some U ′ ∈ [U ] and some V ′ ∈ [V ], then U ′′ ≤ V ′′ for all U ′′ ∈ [U ] and all
V ′′ ∈ [V ].
Lemma A.6: ≤ is a well-founded relation on F ′/∼.
Proof: Note that if [U ] < [V ], then µ(V |U ∪ V ) = 0. It now follows from countable
additivity that < is a well-founded order on these equivalence classes. For suppose that
there exists an infinite decreasing sequence [U0] > [U1] > [U2] > . . .. Since F is a
σ-algebra, ∪∞i=0Ui ∈ F ; since F ′ is closed under supersets, ∪∞i=0Ui ∈ F ′. By CP3,
µ(Uj | ∪∞i=0 Ui) = µ(Uj |Uj ∪ Uj+1)× µ(Uj ∪ Uj+1 | ∪∞i=0 Ui) = 0.
Let V0 = U0 and, for j > 0, let Vj = Uj− (∪j−1i=0Uj). Clearly the Vj ’s are pairwise disjoint,
∪iUi = ∪iVi, and µ(Vj | ∪∞i=0Ui) ≤ µ(Uj | ∪∞i=0Ui) = 0. It now follows that using countable
additivity that
1 = µ(∪∞i=0Ui | ∪∞i=0 Ui) =
∞∑
i=0
µ(Vi | ∪∞i=0 Ui) = 0.
This is as contradiction, so the equivalence classes are well-founded.
Because ≤ is well-founded, there is an order-preserving bijection O from F ′/∼ to an
initial segment of the ordinals (i.e., [U ] ≤ [V ] iff O([U ]) ≤ O([V ]). Thus, the equivalence
classes can be enumerated using all the ordinals less than some ordinal α. By Lemma A.5,
there are sets Uβ , β < α, in F ′ such that if O([U ]) = β, then Uβ ∈ [U ] and µ(Uβ |U∪Uβ) =
1 for all U ′ ∈ [U ]. Define an LPS ~µ = (µ0, µ1, . . .) of length α by taking µβ(V ) = µ(V |Uβ).
The choice of the Uβ’s guarantees that this is actually an SLPS.
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It remains to show that (W,F ,F ′, µ) is the result of applying FS→P to (W,F , ~µ).
Suppose that instead (W,F ,F ′′, µ′) is the result. The argument that F ′′ ⊆ F ′ is identical
to that in the finite case: If V ∈ F ′′, then µβ(V ) > 0 for some β. Thus, µ(V |Uβ) > 0.
Since Uβ ∈ F ′, it follows that V ∈ F ′. Thus, F ′′ ⊆ F ′.
Now suppose that V ∈ F ′. Thus, V ∼ Vβ for some β < α. It follows that µ(V | Vβ) >
0, so V ∈ F ′′.
Finally, to show that µ(U | V ) = µ′(U | V ), suppose that β is such that V ∼ Vβ. It
follows that µ(V | Vβ′) = 0 for β ′ < β and µ(V | Vβ) > 0. Thus, by definition, µ′(U | V ) =
µβ(U | V ). Without loss of generality, assume that U ⊆ V (otherwise replace U by U∩V ).
Thus, by CP3,
µ(U | V )× µ(V | V ∪ Vβ) = µ(U | V ∪ Vβ). (2)
Suppose V ′ ⊆ V . Clearly
µ(V ′ | V ∪ Vβ) = µ(V ′ ∩ Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) + µ(V ′ ∩ Vβ | V ∪ Vβ).
Now by CP3 and the fact that µ(Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) = 1,
µ(V ′ ∩ Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) = µ(V ′ | Vβ)× µ(Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) = µ(V ′ | Vβ)
and
µ(V ′ ∩ Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) ≤ µ(Vβ | V ∪ Vβ) = 0.
Thus, µ(V ′ | V ∪Vβ) = µ(V ′ | Vβ). Applying this observation to both U and V shows that
µ(V | V ∪Vβ) = µ(V | Vβ) and µ(U | V ∪Vβ) = µ(U | Vβ). Plugging this into (2), it follows
that
µ(U | V ) = µ(U | Vβ)/µ(V | Vβ) = µβ(U)/µβ(V ) = µβ(U | V ) = µ′(U | V ).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proposition 3.9: The map FS→P is a surjection from SLPS
c(W,F ,F ′) onto T c(W,F ,F ′).
Proof: Suppose that µ ∈ T c(W,F ,F ′). I want to construct an SLPS ~µ ∈ SLPS c(W,F ,F ′)
such that FS→P (~µ) = µ. I first label each element of F ′ with a natural number. Intu-
itively, if U ∈ F ′ is labeled k, then k will be the least index such that µk(U) > 0. The
labeling is done by induction on k. Each topmost set in the forest (i.e., the root of some
tree in the forest) is labeled 0, as are all sets U ′ such that µ(U ′ |U) > 0, where U is a
topmost node. These are all the nodes labeled by 0. Label all the maximal unlabeled
sets by 1 (that is, label U ∈ F ′ by 1 if it is not labeled 0, and is not a subset of another
unlabeled set); in addition, label a set U ′ by 1 if µ(U ′ |U) > 0 and U is labeled by 1.
Note that every set at depth 0 or 1 in the forest is labeled by either 0 or 1.
Suppose that the labeling process has been completed for labels 0, . . . , k such that
the following properties hold, where label(U) denotes the label of the event U :
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• all sets up to depth k in the forest have been labeled;
• if label(U) = k′, U ′ ∈ F ′, and µ(U ′ |U) > 0, then label(U ′) ≤ label(U).
Label all the maximal unlabeled sets with k + 1; in addition, if U ′ is unlabeled and
µ(U ′ |U) > 0 for some U such that label(U) = k + 1, then assign label k + 1 to U ′.
Clearly the two properties above continue to hold. This completes the labeling process.
Let Ck be the set of maximal sets in F ′ labeled k. T2 and T3 guarantee that, for all k,
the sets in Ck are disjoint. Let µ′k be an arbitrary probability on W such that µ′k(U) > 0
for all U ∈ Ck and∑U∈Ck µ′k(U) = 1. Define an LPS ~µ = (µ0, µ1, . . .) as follows (where the
length of ~µ is ω if Ck 6= ∅ for all k, and is k+1 if k is the largest integer such that Ck 6= ∅).
For V ∈ F , let µj(V ) = ∑U∈Cj µ(V |U)µ′j(U). I now show that ~µ(V |U) = µ(V |U) for
all V ∈ F and U ∈ F ′. Suppose that U ∈ Ck. Then µj(U) = 0 for all j < k, and
µk(U) > 0. Thus, ~µ(V |U) = µk(V |U). But it is immediate from the definition that
µk(V |U) = µ(V |U). Thus, FS→P (~µ) = µ. Moreover, if U ∈ F ′ and label(U) = k, let U ′
be the maximal set containing U such that label(U ′) = k. (The labeling guarantees that
such a set exists.) Then µk(U
′) = µ(U ′ |U) > 0. It follows that ~µ(U) > 0 for all u ∈ F ′.
Finally, note that ~µ is an SLPS (in fact, an LCPS). If Uk = ∪Ck − ∪k′>k(∪Ck′), then the
sets Uk are disjoint, and µk(Uk) = 1.
Proposition 4.2: If ν ≈ ~µ, then ν(U) > 0 iff ~µ(U) > ~0. Moreover, if ν(U) > 0,
then st (ν(V |U)) = µj(V |U), where µj is the first probability measure in ~µ such that
µj(U) > 0.
Proof: Recall that for U ⊆ W , χU is the indicator function for U ; that is, χU(w) = 1
if w ∈ U and χU(w) = 0 otherwise. Notice that Eν(χU) > Eν(χ∅) iff ν(U) > 0 and
E~µ(χU) > E~µ(χ∅) iff ~µ(U) > ~0. Since ν ≈ ~µ, it follows that ν(U) > 0 iff ~µ(U) >
~0. If ν(U) > 0, note that Eν(χU∩V − rχU) > Eν(χ∅) iff r < st (ν(V |U)). Similarly,
E~µ(χU∩V − rχU) > E~µ(χ∅) iff r < µj(U), where j is the least index such that µj(U) > 0.
It follows that st (ν(V |U)) = µj(V |U).
Proposition 4.3: If ~µ, ~µ′ ∈ SLPS(W,F), then ~µ ≈ ~µ′ iff ~µ = ~µ′.
Proof: Clearly ~µ = ~µ′ implies that ~µ ≈ ~µ′. For the converse, suppose that ~µ ≈ ~µ′ for
~µ, ~µ′ ∈ SLPS (W,F). If ~µ 6= ~µ′, let α be the least ordinal such that µα 6= µ′α, and let U be
such that µα(U) 6= µ′α(U). Without loss of generality, suppose that µα(U) > µ′α(U). Let
the sets Uβ be such that µβ(Uβ) = 1 and µβ(Uγ) = 0 if γ > β; similarly choose the sets
U ′β. Since µβ = µ
′
β for β < α, it follows that µβ(Uα ∪ U ′α) = µ′β(Uα ∪ U ′α) = 0 for β < α;
moreover, µα(Uα ∪U ′α) = µ′α(Uα ∪U ′α) = 1. Choose r such that µα(U) > r > µ′α(U). Let
X be the random variable χU − rχUα∪U ′α and let Y = χ∅. Then E~µ(X) > E~µ(Y ), while
E~µ′(X) < E~µ′(Y ), so ~µ 6≈ ~µ′.
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Proposition 4.4: If W is finite, then every LPS over (W,F) is equivalent to an LPS
of length at most |Basic(F)|.
Proof: Suppose that W is finite and Basic(F) = {U1, . . . , Uk}. Given an LPS ~µ, define
a finite subsequence ~µ′ = (µk0, . . . , µkh) of ~µ as follows. Let µk0 = µ0. Suppose that
µk0, . . . , µkj have been defined. If all probability measures in ~µ with index greater that
kj are linear combinations of the probability measures with index µk0, . . . , µkj , then take
~µ′ = (µk0, . . . , µkj). Otherwise, let µkj+1 be the probability measure in ~µ with least index
that is not a linear combination of µk0, . . . , µkj . Since a probability measure over (W,F)
is determined by its value on the sets in Basic(F), a probability measure over (W,F)
can be identified with a vector in IR|Basic(F)|: the vector defining the probabilities of
the elements in Basic(F). There can be at most |Basic(F)| linearly independent such
vectors, thus ~µ′ has length at most |Basic(F)|.
It remains to show that ~µ′ is equivalent to ~µ. Given random variables X and Y ,
suppose that E~µ(X) < E~µ(Y ). Then there is some minimal index β such that Eµγ (X) =
Eµγ (Y ) for all γ < β and Eµβ(X) < Eµβ (Y ). It follows that µβ cannot be a linear
combination of µγ for γ < β. Thus, µβ is one of the probability measures in ~µ
′. Moreover,
the expected value of X and Y agree for all probability measures in ~µ′ with lower index
(since they do in ~µ). Thus, E~µ′(X) < E~µ′(X).
The argument in the other direction is similar in spirit and left to the reader.
Theorem 4.5: IfW is finite, then FL→N is a bijection from LPS(W,F)/≈ to NPS(W,F)/≈
that preserves equivalence (that is, each NPS in FL→N([~µ]) is equivalent to ~µ).
Proof: I first provide a sufficient condition for an NPS to be equivalent an LPS in a
finite space.
Lemma A.7: Suppose that ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µk), and ǫ0, . . . , ǫk are such that st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∑ki=0 ǫi = 1. Then ~µ ≈ ǫ0µ0 + · · ·+ ǫkµk.11
Proof: Suppose that there exist ǫ, . . . , ǫk as in the statement of the lemma and ν =
ǫ0µ0 + · · ·+ ǫkµk. I want to show that ~µ ≈ ν.
If E~µ(X) < E~µ(Y ), then there exists some j ≤ k such that Eµj (X) < Eµj (Y )
and Eµj′ (X) = Eµj′ (Y ) for all j
′ < j. Since Eν(X) =
∑k
i=0 ǫiEµi(X) and Eν(Y ) =∑k
i=0 ǫiEµi(Y ), to show that Eν(X) < Eν(Y ), it suffices to show that ǫj(Eµj (Y ) −
Eµj (X)) >
∑k
i=j+1 ǫi(Eµi(X) − Eµi(Y )). Since ǫj′+1 ≤ ǫj′ for j′ ≥ j (this follows
from the fact that st (ǫj′+1/ǫj
′) = 0), it follows that
∑k
i=j+1 ǫi(Eµi(X) − Eµi(Y )) ≤
ǫj+1
∑k
i=j+1 |Eµi(X) − Eµi(Y )|. Thus, it suffices to show that ǫj+1
∑k
i=j+1 |Eµi(X) −
11Although I do not need this fact here, it is easy to see that if W is finite and ~µ = (µ0, . . . , µk) is an
SLPS in LPS (W,F), then the converse of Lemma A.7 holds as well: if ν ≈ ~µ, then ν = ǫ0µ0 + · · · ǫkµk
for some ǫ0, . . . , µk are such that st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k− 1 and
∑
k
i=0
ǫi = 1. (I conjecture this
fact is true in general, not just if ~µ is an SLPS, but I have not checked this.
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Eµi(Y )| < ǫj(Eµj (Y ) − Eµj (X)). This is trivially the case if Eµi(X) = Eµi(Y ) for all i
such that j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, assume without loss of generality that ∑ki=j+1 |Eµi(X)−
Eµi(Y )| > 0. In this case, it suffices to show that ǫj+1/ǫj < (Eµj (Y )−Eµj (X))/
∑k
i=j+1 |Eµi(X)−
Eµi(Y )|. Since the right-hand side of the inequality is a positive real and st (ǫj+1/ǫj) = 0,
the result follows.
The argument in the opposite direction is similar. Suppose that Eν(X) < Eν(Y ).
Again, since Eν(X) =
∑k
i=0 ǫiEµi(X) and Eν(Y ) =
∑k
i=0 ǫiEµi(Y ), it must be the case
that if j is the least index such that Eµj (X) 6= Eµj (Y ), then Eµj (X) < Eµj (Y ). Thus,
E~µ(X) < E~µ(Y ). It follows that ~µ ≈ ν.
It remains to show that, given an NPS (W,F , ν), there is an equivalence class [~µ]
such that FL→N([~µ]) = [ν]. As I said in the main text, the goal now is to find (standard)
probability measures µ0, . . . , µk and ǫ0, . . . , ǫk such that st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0 and ν = ǫ0µ0 +
· · ·+ ǫkµk. If this can be done then, by Lemma A.7, ν ≈ (µ0, . . . , µk), and we are done.
Suppose that Basic(F) = {U1, . . . , Uk} and that ν has range IR∗. Note that a prob-
ability measure ν ′ on F can be identified with a vector (a1, . . . , ak) over IR∗, where
ν ′(Ui) = ai, so that a1 + · · · + ak = 1. In the rest of this proof, I frequently identify ν
with such a vector.
Lemma A.8: There exist k′ ≤ k, ǫ0, . . . , ǫk′ where ǫ0 = 1, st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0 for i =
1, . . . , k′ − 1, and standard real-valued vectors ~bj, j = 0, . . . , k′, in IRk such that
ν =
k′∑
j=0
ǫj~bj .
Proof: I show by induction on m ≤ k that there exist ǫ0, . . . , ǫm and m′ ≤ m such
that ǫj = 0 for j
′ > m′, st (ǫi+1/ǫi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , m
′ − 1, and standard vectors ~bj
j = 0, . . . , m − 1 and a possibly nonstandard vector ~b′m = (b′m1, . . . , b′mk) such that (a)
ν =
∑m−1
j=0 ǫj
~bj + ǫm~b
′
m, (b) |b′mi| ≤ 1, and (c) at least m of b′m1, . . . , b′mk are standard.
For the base case (where m = 0), just take ~b′0 = ν and ǫ0 = 1. For the inductive
step, suppose that 0 ≤ m < k. If ~b′m is standard, then take ~bm = ~b′m, ~bm+1 = ~0, and
ǫm+1 = 0. Otherwise, let ~bm = st
(
~b′m
)
and let ~b′′m+1 =
~b′m −~bm. Let ǫ′ = max{|b′′(m+1)i| :
i = 1, . . . , k}. Since not all components of ~b′m are standard, ǫ′ > 0. Note that, by
construction, st (ǫ′/bmi) = 0 if bmi 6= 0, for i = 1, . . . , k. Let ~b′m+1 = ~b′′m+1/ǫ′ and let
ǫm+1 = ǫ
′ǫm. By construction, |b′(m+1)i| ≤ 1 and at least one component of ~b′m+1 is either
1 or −1. Moreover, if b′mi is standard, then b′′(m+1)i = b′(m+1)i = 0. Thus, ~b′m+1 has at
least one more standard component that ~b′m. Since clearly ν =
∑m
j=0 ǫj
~bj+ ǫm+1~b
′
m+1, this
completes the inductive step. The lemma follows immediately.
Returning to the proof of Theorem 4.5, I next prove by induction on m that for
all m ≤ k′ (where k′ ≤ k is as in Lemma A.8), there exist standard probability
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measures µ0, . . . , µm, (standard) vectors ~bm+1, . . . ,~bk′ ∈ IRk, and ǫ1, . . . , ǫk′ such that
ν =
∑m
j=0 ǫjµj +
∑k′
j=m+1 ǫj
~bj .
The base case is immediate from Lemma A.8: taking~bj , j = 1, . . . , k
′ as in Lemma A.8,
~b0 is in fact a probability measure since ~b0 = st (ν). Suppose that the result holds for
m. Consider ~bm+1. If b(m+1)i < 0 for some j then, since ν(Ui) ≥ 0, there must ex-
ist j′ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that µj′(Ui) > 0. Thus, there exists some N > 0 such that
N(µj′(Ui)) + b(m+1)i > 0. Since there are only finitely many basic elements and every
element in the vector µj is nonnegative, for j = 0, . . . , m, there must exist some N
′ such
that ~b′m+1 = N
′(µ0 + · · ·+ µm) +~bm+1 ≥ 0. Let c = ∑ki=1 b′(m+1)i, and let µm+1 = ~b′m+1/c.
Clearly, ν = (ǫ0 − N ′ǫm+1)µ0 + · · · (ǫm − N ′ǫm+1)µm + cǫm+1µm+1 + ∑k′j=m+2~bj . This
completes the proof of the inductive step.
The theorem now immediately follows.
Proposition 4.6: Every LPS over (W,F) is equivalent to an LPS over (W,F) of length
at most |F|.
Proof: The argument is essentially the same as that for Proposition 4.4, using the
observation that a probability measure over (W,F) can be identified with an element of
IR|F|; the vector defining the probabilities of the elements in F . I leave details to the
reader.
Proposition A.9: For the NPS (W,F , ν) constructed in Example 4.10, there is no LPS
~µ over (W,F) such that ν ≈ ~µ.
Proof: I start with a straightforward lemma.
Lemma A.10: Given an LPS ~µ, there is an LPS ~µ′ such that ~µ ≈ ~µ′ and all the
probability measures in ~µ′ are distinct.
Proof: Define ~µ′ to be the subsequence consisting of all the distinct probability measures
in ~µ. That is, suppose that ~µ = (µ0, µ1, . . .). Then ~µ
′ = (µk0, µk1, . . .), where k0 = 0,
and, if kα has been defined for all α < β and there exists an index γ such that µkα 6= µγ
for all α ≤ β, then kβ is the least index δ such that µkα 6= µδ for all α < β. If there is no
index γ such that µγ /∈ {µkα : α < β}, then ~µ′ = (µkα : α < β). I leave it to the reader
to check that ~µ ≈ ~µ′.
Returning to the proof of Proposition A.9, suppose by way of contradiction that ν ≈ ~µ.
Without loss of generality, by Lemma A.10, assume that all the probability measures in
~µ are distinct. Clearly Eν(χW ) < Eν(αχ{w1}) if α ≥ 2 and Eν(χW ) > Eν(αχ{w1})
if α < 2. Since ν ≈ ~µ, it must be the case that E~µ(χW ) < E~µ(αχ{w1}) if α ≥ 2
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and E~µ(χW ) > E~µ(αχ{w1}) if α < 2. Since E~µ(χW ) = (1, 1, . . .), it follows that if
~µ = (µ0, µ1, . . .), it must be the case that µ0(w1) = 1/2 and
µ1(w1) ≥ 1/2. (3)
Similar arguments (comparing χW to χ{wj}) can be used to show that µ0(wj) = 1/2
j and
µ1(w2j−1) ≥ 1/2j for j = 1, 2, . . .. Next, observe that Eν(χ{w1}−22k−1χ{w2k}) = (2k+1)ǫ.
Thus,
Eν(χ{w1} − 22k−1χ{w2k}) = Eν((2k + 1)(χ{w1} − (χW/2))).
It follows that the same relationship must hold if ν is replaced by ~µ. That is,
µ1(w1)− 22k−1µ1(w2k) = (2k + 1)(µ1(w1)− (1/2)).
Rearranging terms, this gives
2kµ1(w1) + 2
2k−1µ1(w2k) = 2
k−1 + 1/2,
or
µ1(w1) + 2
k−1µ1(w2k) = 1/2 + 1/2
k+1. (4)
Thus, µ1(w1) ≤ 1/2+1/2k+1 for all k ≥ 1. Putting this together with (3), it follows that
µ1(w1) = 1/2. Plugging this into (4) gives µ1(w2k) = 1/2
2k. It now follows that µ1 = µ0,
contradicting the choice of ~µ.
Theorem 5.1: FN→P is a bijection from NPS(W,F)/ ≃ to Pop(W,F) and from
NPSc(W,F)/≃ to Popc(W,F).
Proof: As I said in the main text, the proof that FN→P is an injection is straightforward,
and to prove that it is a surjection in the countably additive case, it suffices to show that
FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ), where ν ≈ ~µ′ and ~µ′ is the countably additive SLPS such
that FS→P ((W,F , ~µ′)) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). I now do this.
Suppose that FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′1, µ1). First I show that ν(U) = 0 iff ~µ′(U) =
~0. Let X = χU and Y = χ∅. Note that ν(U) = 0 iff Eν(X) = Eν(Y ) iff E~µ′(X) = E~µ′(Y )
iff ~µ′(U) = ~0. Thus, F ′1 = {U : ν(U) 6= 0} = {U : ~µ′(U) 6= ~0} = F ′.
Now suppose by way of contradiction that µ 6= µ1. Thus, there must exist some
V ∈ F , U ∈ F ′ such that µ(V |U) 6= µ1(V |U). Let β be the smallest ordinal such that
µ′β(U) 6= 0. It follows that µ′β(V |U) 6= st (ν(V |U)). We can assume without loss of gen-
erality that µ′β(V |U) > st (ν(V |U)). Choose a real number r such that µ′β(V |U) > r >
st (ν(V |U)). Then E~µ′(χV ∩U) > E~µ′(rχU) but Eν(χV ∩U) < Eν(rχU). This contradicts
the assumption that ~µ′ ≈ ν. It follows that FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ), as desired.
It remains to show that if (W,F ,F ′, µ) ∈ Pop(W,F) − Popc(W,F), then there is
some (W,F , ν) ∈ NPS (W,F) such that FN→P (W,Fν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ). My proof in this
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case follows closely the lines of an analogous result proved by McGee [1994]. I provide
the details here mainly for completeness.
The proof relies on the following ultrafilter construction of non-Archimedean fields.
Given a set S, a filter G on S is a nonempty set of subsets of F that is closed under
supersets (so that if U ∈ G and U ⊆ U ′, then U ′ ∈ G), is closed under finite intersections
(so that if U1, U2 ∈ G, then U1 ∩ U2 ∈ G), and does not contain ∅. An ultrafilter is a
maximal filter, that is, a filter that is not a strict subset of any other filter. It is not hard
to show that if U is an ultrafilter on S, then for all U ⊆ S, either U ∈ U or U ∈ U [Bell
and Slomson 1974].
Suppose F is either IR or a non-Archimedean field, J is an arbitrary set, and U
is an ultrafilter on J . Define an equivalence relation ∼U on F J by taking (aj : j ∈
J) ∼U (bj : j ∈ J) if {j : aj = bj} ∈ U . Similarly, define a total order U by taking
(aj : j ∈ J) U (bj : j ∈ J) if {j : aj ≤ bj} ∈ U . (The fact that ≤U is total uses the fact
that for all U ⊆ J , either U ∈ U or U ∈ U . Note that the pointwise ordering on F J is
not total.) Let F J/∼U consist of these equivalence classes. Note that F can be viewed
as a subset of F J/∼U by identifying a ∈ F with the sequence of all a’s.
Define addition and multiplication on F J pointwise, so that, for example, (aj : j ∈
J)+(bj : j ∈ J) = (aj+bj : j ∈ J). It is easy to check that if (aj : j ∈ J) ∼U (a′j : j ∈ J),
then (aj : j ∈ J) + (bj : j ∈ J) ∼U (a′j : j ∈ J) + (bj : j ∈ J), and similarly for
multiplication. Thus, the definitions of + and × can be extended in the obvious way to
F J/∼U . With these definitions, it is easy to check that F J/∼U is a field that contains F .
Now given a Popper space (W,F ,F ′, µ) and a finite subset A = {U1, . . . , Uk} ⊆
F , let FA be the (finite) algebra generated by A (that is, the smallest set containing
{U1, . . . , Uk,W} that is closed under unions and complement). Let F ′A = FA ∩ F ′. It
follows from Theorem 3.1 that there is a finite SLPS ~µA over (W,FA) that is mapped to
(W,FA,F ′A′, µA) by FS→P . (Although Theorem 3.1 is stated for finite state spacesW , the
proof relies on only the fact that the algebra is finite, so it applies without change here.)
It now follows from Theorem 4.5 that, for each A, there is a nonstandard probability
space (W,FA, νA) with range IR(ǫ) that is equivalent to ~µA. By Proposition 4.2, it follows
that for U ∈ F ′A iff νA(U) = 0. Moreover, st (νA(V |U)) = µA(V |U) for U ∈ F ′A and
V ∈ FA.
Let J consist of all finite subsets of F . For a subset A of F , let GA be the subset of
2J consisting of all sets in J containing A. Let G = {G ⊆ J : G ⊇ GA for some A ⊆ F}.
It is easy to check that G is a filter on J . It is a standard result that every filter can be
extended to an ultrafilter [Bell and Slomson 1974]. Let U be an ultrafilter containing G.
By the construction above, R(ǫ)/∼U is a non-Archimedean field.
Define ν on (W,F) by taking ν(U) = (νA(U) : A ∈ J), where νA(U) is taken to be 0
if U /∈ FA. To see that ν is indeed a nonstandard probability measure with the required
properties, note that clearly ν(W ) = 1 (where 1 is identified with the sequence of all
1’s). Moreover, to see that ν(U)+ ν(V ) = ν(U ∪V ), let AU,V be the smallest subalgebra
containing U and V . Note that if A ⊃ AU,V , then νA(U) + νA(V ) = νA′(U ∪ V ). Since
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the set of algebras containing AU,V is an element of the ultrafilter, the result follows.
Similar arguments show that ν(U) = 0 iff U ∈ F ′ and that st (ν(V |U)) = µ(V |U) if
U ∈ F ′ and V ∈ F . Clearly FN→P (ν) = µ.
Proposition 5.2: If ν1 ≈ ν2 then ν1 ≃ ν2.
Proof: Suppose that ν1 ≈ ν2. To show that ν1 ≃ ν2, first suppose that ν1(U) 6= 0
for some U ⊆ W . Then Eν1(χ∅) < Eν1(χU). Since ν1 ≈ ν2, it must be the case that
Eν2(χ∅) < Eν2(χU). Thus, ν2(U) 6= 0. A symmetric argument shows that if ν2(U) 6= 0
then ν1(U) 6= 0. Next, suppose that ν1(U) 6= 0 and ν1(V |U) = α. Thus, Eν1(αχU) =
Eν1(χU∩V ). Since ν1 ≈ ν2, it follows that Eν2(αχU) = Eν2(χU∩V ), and so ν2(V |U) = α.
Thus, st (ν1(V |U)) = st (ν2(V |U)). Hence, ν1 ≃ ν2, as desired.
Theorem 6.5: There exists an NPS ν whose range is an elementary extension of the
reals such that ~µ ≈ ν and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ν iff there exists a
sequence ~rj, j = 1, 2, . . . of vectors in (0, 1)k such that ~rj → (0, . . . , 0) as j → ∞, and
X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ~µ✷~r
j for j = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
Proof: Suppose that there exists an NPS ν whose range is an elementary extension of the
reals, ~µ ≈ ν, and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ν. Using arguments similar
in spirit to those the arguments of BBD [1991b, Proposition 2], it follows that there exist
positive infinitesimals ǫ1, . . . , ǫk such that ~µ✷ (ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = ν. It is not hard to show that
there exist a finite set of real-valued polynomials p1, . . . , pN such that pj(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = 0
for j = 1, . . . , N and if ~r is a vector of positive reals such that pj(~r) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N ,
then X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ~µ✷~r. Thus, for all natural numbers
m ≥ 1, the range of ν satisfies the first-order property
∃x1 . . .∃xk(p1(x1, . . . , xk) = 0∧. . .∧pN (x1, . . . , xk) = 0∧0 < x1 < 1/m∧. . .∧0 < xk < 1/m).
Since the range of ν is an elementary extension of the reals, this first-order property
holds of the reals as well. Thus, there exists a sequence ~rj of vectors of positive reals
converging to ~0 such that pj(~r
j) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N .
The converse follows by a straightforward application of compactness in first-order
logic [Enderton 1972]. Suppose that there exists a sequence ~rj, j = 1, 2, . . . of vectors in
(0, 1)k such that ~rj → (0, . . . , 0) as j →∞, and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect
to ~µ✷~rj for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .. We now apply the compactness theorem. As I mentioned
in the proof of Proposition 4.6, the compactness theorem says that, given a collection
for formulas, if each finite subset has a model, then so does the whole set. Consider a
language with the function symbols + and ×, the binary relation ≤, a constant symbol
r for each real number r, a unary predicate N (representing the natural numbers), and
constant symbols pU for each set U ∈ F . Intuitively, pU represents ν(U). Consider the
following (uncountable) collection of formulas:
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(a) All first-order formulas in this language true of the reals. (This includes, for exam-
ple, a formula such as ∀x∀y(x+y = y+x), which says that addition is commutative,
as well as formulas such as 2+ 3 = 5 and
√
2×√3 = √6.)
(b) Formulas pU > 0 for U ∈ F ′ and pU = 0 for U ∈ F − F ′.
(c) Formulas pU + pV = pU∪V if U ∩ V = ∅.
(d) The formula pW = 1.
(e) Formulas of the form pX1=x1 × · · · × pXn=xn = pX1=x1∩...∩Xn=xn , for all values xi ∈
V(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n; these formulas say that X1, . . . , Xn are independent with
respect to ν.
(f) For every pair of Y , Y ′ of random variables such that E~µ(Y ) ≥ E~µ(Y ′), a formula
that says Eν(Y ) ≥ Eν(Y ′), where Eν(Y ) and Eν(Y ′) are expressed using the con-
stant symbols pU (where the events U are those of the form Y = y and Y
′ = y′).
Note that this formula is finite, since X and Y are assumed to have finite range.
The formula would not be expressible in first-order logic if X or Y had infinite
range.
It is not hard to show that every finite subset of these formulas is satisfiable. In-
deed, given a finite subset of formulas, there must exist some m such that taking
pU = ~µ✷~r
m(U) will work (and interpreting r as the real number r, of course). The
only nonobvious part is showing that we can deal with the formulas in part (f); that
we can do so follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in [Blume, Brandenburger, and
Dekel 1991b], which shows that E~µ(Y
′) > E~µ(Y ) iff there exists some M such that
E~µ✷~rm(Y
′) > E~µ✷~rm(Y ) for all m, then E~µ(Y
′) > E~µ(Y ).
Since every finite set of formulas is satisfiable, by compactness, the infinite set is
satisfiable. Let ν(U) be the interpretation of pU in a model satisfying these formulas.
Then it is easy to check that ν is an elementary extension of the reals, ν ≈ ~µ, and that
X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ν.
Theorem 6.6: X1, . . . , Xn are strongly independent with respect to the Popper space
(W,F ,F ′, µ) iff there exists an NPS (W,F , ν) such that FN→P (W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ)
and X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to (W,F , ν).
Proof: It easily follows from Kohlberg and Reny’s [1997, Theorem 2.10] characterization
of strong independence that if X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to the NPS
(W,F , ν) then X1, . . . , Xn are strongly independent with respect to FN→P (W,F , ν).
The converse follows using compactness, much as in the proof of Theorem 6.5. Sup-
pose that (W,F ,F ′, µ) is a Popper space and µj → µ are as required for X1, . . . , Xn to
be strongly independent with respect to µ. Consider the same language as in the proof
of Theorem 6.5, and essentially the same collection of formulas, except that the formulas
of part (f) are replaced by
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(f′) Formulas of the form (r− 1
n
)pV ≤ pU∩V ≤ (r+ 1n)pV for all U , V , r, and n > 0
such that µ(U | V ) = r.
Again, it is easy to see that every finite subset of these formulas is satisfiable. Indeed,
given a finite subset of formulas, there must exist some m such that taking pU = µm(U)
satisfies all the formulas (and interpreting r as the real number r, of course). By com-
pactness, the infinite set is satisfiable. Let ν(U) be the interpretation of pU in a model
satisfying these formulas. Then it is easy to check that FL→N(W,F , ν) = (W,F ,F ′, µ),
and that X1, . . . , Xn are independent with respect to ν.
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